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Abstract
Error-correcting codes that admit local decoding and correcting algorithms have been the
focus of much recent research due to their numerous theoretical and practical applications.
An important goal is to obtain the best possible tradeoffs between the number of queries the
algorithm makes to its oracle (the locality of the task), and the amount of redundancy in the
encoding (the information rate).
In Hamming’s classical adversarial channel model, the current tradeoffs are dramatic, al-
lowing either small locality, but superpolynomial blocklength, or small blocklength, but high
locality. However, in the computationally bounded, adversarial channel model, proposed by
Lipton (STACS 1994), constructions of locally decodable codes suddenly exhibit small locality
and small blocklength, but these constructions require strong trusted setup assumptions e.g.,
Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai (ICALP 2007) construct private locally decodable codes in the
setting where the sender and receiver already share a symmetric key.
We study variants of locally decodable and locally correctable codes in computationally
bounded, adversarial channels, in a setting with no public-key or private-key cryptographic
setup. The only setup assumption we require is the selection of the public parameters (seed) for
a collision-resistant hash function. Specifically, we provide constructions of relaxed locally cor-
rectable and relaxed locally decodable codes over the binary alphabet, with constant information
rate, and poly-logarithmic locality.
Our constructions, which compare favorably with their classical analogues in the computa-
tionally unbounded Hamming channel, crucially employ collision-resistant hash functions and
local expander graphs, extending ideas from recent cryptographic constructions of memory-hard
functions.
1 Introduction
Classically, an error-correcting code is a tuple (Enc,Dec) of encoding and decoding algorithms em-
ployed by a sender to encode messages, and by a receiver to decode them, after potential corruption
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by a noisy channel during transmission. Specifically, the sender encodes a message m of k symbols
from an alphabet Σ into a codeword c of block-length n consisting of symbols over the same alpha-
bet, via Enc : Σk → Σn. The receiver uses Dec : Σn → Σk to recover the message from a received
word w ∈ Σn, a corrupted version of some Enc(m). Codes over the binary alphabet Σ = {0, 1}
are preferred in practice. The quantities of interest in designing classical codes are the information
rate, defined as k/n, and the error rate, which is the tolerable fraction of errors in the received
word. Codes with both large information rate and large error rate are most desirable.
In modern uses of error-correcting codes, one may only need to recover small portions of the
message, such as a single bit. In such settings, the decoder may not need to read the entire received
word w ∈ Σn, but only read a few bits of it. Given an index i ∈ [n] and oracle access to w, a
local decoder must make only q = o(n) queries into w, and output the bit mi. Codes that admit
such fast decoders are called locally decodable codes (LDCs) [KT00, STV99]. The parameter q is
called the locality of the decoder. A related notion is that of locally correctable codes (LCCs). LCCs
are codes for which the local decoder with oracle access to w must output bits of the codeword
c, instead of bits of the message m. LDCs and LCCs have widespread applications in many areas
of theoretical computer science, including private information retrieval, probabilistically checkable
proofs, self-correction, fault-tolerant circuits, hardness amplification, and data structures (e.g.,
[BFLS91, LFKN92, BLR93, BK95, CKGS98, CGdW13, ALRW17]). See surveys [Tre04, Gas04].
However, constructions of such codes suffer from apparently irreconcilable tension between locality
and rate: existing codes with constant locality have slightly subexponential blocklength [Yek08,
Efr12, DGY11], and codes of linear blocklength have slightly subpolynomial query complexity
[KMRS17]. See surveys by Yekhanin [Yek12] and by Kopparty and Saraf [KS16].
Ben-Sasson et al. [BGH+06] propose the notion of relaxed locally decodable codes (RLDCs) that
remedies the dramatic tradeoffs of classical LDCs. In this notion the decoding algorithm is allowed
to output ⊥ sometimes, to signal that it does not know the correct value; however, it should not
output an incorrect value too often. More formally, given i ∈ [k] and oracle access to the received
word w assumed to be relatively close to some codeword c = Enc(m) ∈ Σn, the local decoder (1)
outputs mi if w = c; (2) outputs either mi or ⊥ with probability 2/3, otherwise; and (3) the set of
indices i such that the decoder outputs mi (the correct value) with probability 2/3 is of size > ρ · k
for some constant ρ > 0. The relaxed definition allows them to achieve RLDCs with constant query
complexity and blocklength n = k1+ǫ.
Recently, Gur et al. [GRR18] introduce the analogous notion of relaxed locally correctable codes
(RLCCs). In particular, upon receiving a word w ∈ Σn assumed to be close to some codeword c,
the decoder: (1) outputs ci if w = c; (2) outputs either ci or ⊥ with probability 2/3, otherwise; and
(3) the set of indices i such that the decoder outputs ci with probability 2/3 is of size ρ ·k, for some
ρ > 0. In fact, [GRR18] omits condition (3) in their definition, since the first two conditions imply
the 3rd, for codes with constant locality that can withstand a constant fraction of error [BGH+06].
The reduction from [BGH+06], however, does not maintain the asymptotic error rate, and in
particular, in the non-constant query complexity regime, the error rate becomes subconstant. Since
our results work in the ω(1)-query regime, we will build codes that achieve the 3rd condition as well
(for constant error rate). The results in [GRR18] obtain significantly better parameters for RLCCs
than for classical LCCs; namely, they construct RLCCs with constant query complexity, polynomial
block length, and constant error rate, and RLCCs with quasipolynomial query complexity, linear
blocklength (constant rate), with the caveat that the error rate is subconstant. These results
immediately extend to RLDCs, since their codes are systematic, meaning that the initial part of
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the encoding consists of the message itself.
Computationally Bounded, Adversarial Channels In this work we study RLDCs and RLCCs
in the more restricted, yet natural, computationally bounded adversarial channel, introduced by
Lipton [Lip94]. All the above constructions of local codes assume a channel that may introduce a
bounded number of adversarial errors, and the channel has as much time as it needs to decide what
positions to corrupt. This setting corresponds to Hamming’s error model, in which codes should
be resilient to any possible error pattern, as long as the number of corruptions is bounded. Hence,
codes built for the Hamming channel are safe for data transmission, but the drastic requirements
lead to coding limitations. By contrast, in his foundational work, Shannon proposes a weaker,
probabilistic channel in which each symbol is corrupted independently, with some fixed probability.
In [Lip94], Lipton argues that many reasonable channels stand somewhere in between these two
extremes, and one may assume that in reality adversaries are computationally bounded, and can
be modeled as polynomial time probabilistic (PPT) algorithms. Variants of this model have been
initially studied for classical error-correcting codes [Lip94, DGL04, MPSW05, GS16, SS16] to show
better error rate capabilities than in the Hamming model. See also Appendix A for further details
on related work.
Ostrovsky et al. [OPS07] introduce the study of “private” locally decodable codes against com-
putationally bounded channels, and build codes with constant information and error rates over the
binary alphabet, which can correct every message bit using only a small (superconstant) number
of queries to the corrupted word. Their results assume the existence of one-way functions, and
require that the encoding and decoding algorithms share a secret key that is not known to the
channel. Hemenway and Ostrovky [HO08] and Hemenway et al. [HOSW11] construct public-key
LDCs assuming the existence of Φ-hiding schemes [CMS99] and of IND-CPA secure cryptosystems,
respectively.
By contrast, our constructions of RLDCs and RLCCs do not require the sender and receiver to ex-
change cryptographic keys. Instead our constructions are based on the existence of collision-resilient
hash functions, a standard cryptographic assumption. Because the parameters of a collision-
resistant hash function are public, any party (sender/receiver/attacker) is able to compute it.
2 Our Contributions
We start by defining the version of relaxed locally correctable codes that is relevant for our model.
We remark that our codes are systematic as well, and therefore the results also apply to the RLDCs
analogue.
Since these codes interact with an adversarial channel, their strength is not only measured in
their error correction and locality capabilities (as is the case for RLCCs/RLDCs in the Hamming
channel), but also in the security they provide against the channel. We present these codes while
describing how they interact with the channel, in order to make the analogy with the classical
setting. We use the notation Enc and Dec to denote encoding and decoding algorithms.
Definition 2.1 A local code is a tuple (Gen,Enc,Dec) of probabilistic algorithms such that
• Gen(1λ) takes as input security parameter λ and generates a public seed s ∈ {0, 1}∗. This
public seed s is fixed once and for all.
3
• Enc takes as input the public seed s and a message x ∈ Σk and outputs a codeword c = Enc(s, x)
with c ∈ Σn.
• Dec takes as input the public seed s, an index i ∈ [n], and is given oracle access to a word
w ∈ Σn. Decw(s, i) outputs a symbol b ∈ Σ (which is supposed to be the value at position i of
the closest codeword to w).
We say that the (information) rate of the code (Gen,Enc,Dec) is k/n. We say that the code is
efficient if Gen,Enc,Dec are all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms.
Definition 2.2 A computational adversarial channel A with error rate τ is an algorithm that
interacts with a local code (Gen,Enc,Dec) in rounds, as follows. In each round of the execution,
given a security parameter λ,
(1) Generate s← Gen(1λ); s is public, so Enc, Dec, and A have access to s
(2) The channel A on input s hands a message x to the sender.
(3) The sender computes c = Enc(s, x) and hands it back to the channel (in fact the channel can
compute c without this interaction).
(4) The channel A corrupts at most τn entries of c to obtain a word w ∈ Σn and selects a
challenge index i ∈ [n]; w is given to the receiver’s Dec with query access along with the
challenge index i.
(5) The receiver outputs b← Decw(s, i).
(6) We define A(s)’s probability of fooling Dec on this round to be pA,s = Pr[b 6∈ {⊥, ci}], where
the probability is taken only over the randomness of the Decw(s, i). We say that A(s) is
γ-successful at fooling Dec if pA,s > γ. We say that A(s) is ρ-successful at limiting Dec if
|GoodA,s| < ρ·n, where GoodA,s ⊆ [n] is the set of indices j such that Pr[Decw(s, j) = cj] > 23 .
We use FoolA,s(γ, τ, λ) (resp. LimitA,s(ρ, τ, λ)) to denote the event that the attacker was γ-
successful at fooling Dec (resp. ρ-successful at limiting Dec) on this round.
We now define our secure RLCC codes against computational adversarial channels.
Definition 2.3 ((Computational) Relaxed Locally Correctable Codes (CRLCC)) A local
code (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a (q, τ, ρ, γ(·), µ(·))-CRLCC against a class A of adversaries if Decw makes
at most q queries to w and satisfies the following:
(1) For all public seeds s if w← Enc(s, x) then Decw(s, i) outputs b = (Enc(s, x))i.
(2) For all A ∈ A we have Pr[FoolA,s(γ(λ), τ, λ)] ≤ µ(λ), where the randomness is taken over the
selection of s← Gen(1λ) as well as A’s random coins.
(3) For all A ∈ A we have Pr[LimitA,s(ρ, τ, λ)] ≤ µ(λ), where the randomness is taken over the
selection of s← Gen(1λ) as well as A’s random coins.
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When µ(λ) = 0, γ(λ) = 13 is a constant and A is the set of all (computationally unbounded)
channels we say that the code is a (q, τ, ρ, γ)-RLCC. When µ(·) is a negligible function and A is
restricted to the set of all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) attackers we say that the code is a
(q, τ, ρ, γ)-CRLCC (computational relaxed locally correctable code).
We say that a code that satisfies conditions 1 and 2 is a Weak CRLCC, while a code satisfying
conditions 1, 2 and 3 is a Strong CRLCC code.
We construct Weak and Strong CRLCCs against PPT adversaries, under the assumption that
Collision-Resistant Hash Functions (CRHF) exist. Briefly, a CRHF function is a pair (GenH,H) of
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms, where GenH takes as input a security parameter
λ and outputs a public seed s ∈ {0, 1}∗; the function H : {0, 1}∗ × Σ∗ → Σℓ(λ), takes as input
the seed s and a long enough input that is hashed into a string of length ℓ(λ). We note that H is
deterministic upon fixing s. The value ℓ(λ) is the length of the hash function. (GenH,H) is said to
be collision-resistant if for all PPT adversaries that take as input the seed s generated by Gen(1λ),
the probability that they produce a collision pair (x, x′), i.e. such that H(s, x) = H(s, x′) and
x 6= x′, is negligible in 1λ.
Theorem 2.4 Assuming the existence of a collision-resistant hash function (GenH,H) with length
ℓ(λ), there exists a constant 0 < τ ′ < 1 and negligible functions µ(·), γ(·) such that for all τ ≤ τ ′
there is a constant 0 < ρ(τ) < 1 , such there exists a constant rate (ℓ(λ)·polylog n, τ, ρ(τ), γ(·), µ(·))-
Weak CRLCC of blocklength n over the binary alphabet. In particular, if ℓ(λ) = polylogλ and
λ ∈ Θ(n) then the code is a (polylog n, τ, ρ, γ, µ(·))-Weak CRLCC.
We note that in the above constructions the codes withstand a constant error rate. The clas-
sical RLCCs of [GRR18] achieve (log n)O(log logn) query complexity, constant information rate, but
subconstant error rate, in the Hamming channel. In order to obtain Strong CRLCC we need fur-
ther technical insights, that builds upon the Weak CRLCCs. Our Strong CRLCCs have the same
parameters, with only a polylog n loss in query complexity.
Theorem 2.5 Assuming the existence of a collision-resistant hash function (GenH,H) with length
ℓ(λ), there exists a constant 0 < τ ′ < 1 and negligible functions µ(·), γ(·) such that for all τ ≤ τ ′
there exist constants 0 < r(τ), ρ(τ) < 1 such that there exists a (ℓ(λ) · polylogn, τ, ρ(τ), γ(·), µ(·))-
Strong CRLCC of blocklength n over the binary alphabet with rate r(τ) where r(.) and ρ(.) have the
property that limτ→0 r(τ) = 1 and limτ→0 ρ(τ) = 1. In particular, if ℓ(λ) = polylog λ and λ ∈ Θ(n)
then the code is a (polylog n, τ, ρ(τ), γ(·), µ(·))-Strong CRLCC.
Remark 2.6 We remark that any Weak CRLCC can be trivially converted into a Strong CRLCC
e.g., by repeating the last bit of the codeword cn times to obtain a new codeword of length (c+1)n.
If we select the constant c > 0 large enough then we can guarantee that, say τ(c+1)n ≤ 4cn/10, so
that a majority of these repeated bits in the codeword are not corrupted and can be corrected with
a simply majority vote. Thus, we can artificially ensure that ρ(τ) > cc+1 since at least cn bits (out
of (c+ 1)n bits) of the codeword can be locally recovered by majority vote. However, to ensure that
ρ(τ) > 23 we would need to set c = 2 which necessarily reduces the rate to r(τ) <
1
c+1 =
1
3 . By
contrast, our Strong CRLCC has rate r(τ) which approaches 1 as τ approaches 0. Furthermore, we
have the property that ρ(τ) approaches 1 as τ approaches 0 which means that almost all bits of the
original codeword can be locally recovered. We also remark that our constructions are systematic and
can be tweaked to yield the existence of a Strong CRLDC with the same parameters. See additional
discussion in Appendix E.
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2.1 Technical Ingredients
At a technical level our construction uses two main building blocks: local expander graphs and
collision resistant hash functions.
Local Expander Graphs Intuitively, given a graph G = (V,E) and distinguished subsetsA,B ⊆
V of nodes such that A and B are disjoint and |A| ≤ |B| we say that the pair (A,B) contains a
δ-expander if for all X ⊆ A and Y ⊆ B with |X| > δ|B| and |Y | > δ|B| there is an edge connecting
X and Y i.e., (X ×Y )∩E 6= ∅. We say that a DAG G is a δ-local expander around a node v if for
any radius r > 0 and any node v ≥ 2r the pair A = {v−2r+1, . . . , v−r} and B = {v−r+1, . . . , v}
contain a δ-expander and the pair C = {v, . . . , v + r − 1} and D = {v + r, . . . , v + 2r − 1} contain
a δ-expander. When this property holds for every node v ∈ V (G) = {1, . . . , n} we simply say that
the DAG G is a δ-local expander. For any constant δ > 0 it is possible to (explicitly) construct
a δ-local expander with the property that indeg(G) ∈ O (log n) and outdeg(G) ∈ O (log n) i.e. no
node has more than O (log n) incoming or outgoing edges [EGS75, ABP18].
Local expanders have several nice properties that have been recently exploited in the design
and analysis of secure data-independent memory hard functions (iMHFs) [ABH17, ABP17, BZ17,
ABP18]. For example, these graphs are maximally depth-robust [ABP18]. Even if we delete a large
number of nodes S ⊆ V the graph still contains a directed path of length n − (1 + ǫ) |S| for some
small constant ǫ dependent on δ — the constant ǫ can approach 0 as δ approaches 0 [ABP18].
More specifically, if we delete a large number of nodes S ⊆ V at least n − (1 + ǫ) |S| of the nodes
have the property that they are α-good (with ǫ =
(
2−α
α
)
) with respect to the deleted set S and
any pair of α-good nodes u and v are connected by a directed path (provided that δ is sufficiently
small) — a node v is α-good with respect to S if for any radius r < v we have at most αr nodes in
S∩[v−r+1, v] and for any radius r ≤ n−v+1 we have at most αr nodes in S∩[v, v+r−1]. For more
formal statements we point the reader to Appendix B. In the context of memory hard functions
each node in the graph corresponds to an intermediate data value generated during computation of
the iMHFs and edges represent data-dependencies. It is known that an iMHF has high cumulative
memory complexity [AS15] if and only if the underlying DAG G is depth-robust [AB16, ABP17] 1.
Suppose that each node is colored red or green and that we are only allowed to query each node to
obtain its color. If we let S denote the set of red nodes then we can develop an efficient randomized
testing algorithm to check if a node v is α-good or not. The tester will make O (polylogn) queries
and, with high probability, will accept any node v that is α1-good and will reject any node w that
is not α2-good for any constants α2 > 4 · α1. Intuitively, for each r ∈ {2
1, 22, . . . , 2log n} the tester
will sample O (polylogn) nodes in the intervals [v, r − 1] and [v − r + 1, v] to make sure that the
fraction of red nodes is at most 2α1. If the tester determines that a node v is at least α2-good for
an appropriately small constant α2 then we can be (almost) certain that the long green path which
contains all n − (1 + ǫ)|S| of the α2-good nodes also includes v. Furthermore, if v < 3n/4 then v
has at least n/4− (1+ ǫ)|S| descendants in this directed green path. Intuitively, in our construction
any such node v must correspond to an uncorrupted portion of the codeword.
Collision Resistant Hash Functions Our constructions employ collision resistant hash func-
tions as a building block. While most of the recent progress on memory hard functions in cryp-
1Oversimplifying a bit, if an attacker attempts to reduce memory usage during computation then the attacker’s
running time will increase dramatically since, by depth-robustness, there will be a long chain of dependent data-values
that that the attacker needs to recompute in the near future.
6
tography combines local expanders (depth-robust graphs) with random oracles (e.g., see [AS15,
AT17, ABP18]), we stress that we do not need to work in the random oracle model2. Indeed, our
constructions only assume the existence of collision resistant hash functions.
Weak CRLCCs We first explain our construction of Weak CRLCCs, which involves labeling a
δ-local expander with k nodes. In particular, given an input word x = (x1 ◦ . . .◦xk) (broken up into
bit strings of length ℓ(λ)) and a k node local expander graph G, the label of node v is computed
as ℓv,s = H (s, xv ◦ ℓv1,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓvd,s) ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(λ), where ℓv1,s, . . . , ℓvd,s are the labels of the parents
v1, . . . , vd of node v, and ◦ denotes string concatenation. When ℓ(λ) ∈ O (polylog λ) we will select
λ ∈ O (n) to ensure that ℓ(λ) ∈ O (polylogn). We use the notation Enc and Dec for the encoding
and decoding of our construction, while we use ECC and ECCD to denote the efficient encoding
and decoding algorithms for a good binary code with constant rate and relative distance (e.g.,
[Jus72, SS96]) which can decode efficiently from some constant fractions of errors.
We first apply ECC to x1, . . . , xk to obtain codewords c1, . . . , ck ∈ {0, 1}
O(ℓ(λ)) where ci =
ECC(xi). Also, for v ∈ [k] we let cv+k = ECC(ℓv,s) which is the encoding of the label corresponding
to the node v in G. The final output is c = (c1 ◦ . . . ◦ c2k−1 ◦ c2k ◦ c2k+1 ◦ . . . ◦ c3k) where c2k+1 =
. . . = c3k = c2k consists of k copies of the last codeword c2k. The final word is an n bit message
with n = O (kℓ (λ)). By repeating this last codeword k times we ensure that it is not possible for
the attacker to irreparably corrupt the final label ℓk,s.
Given a (possibly corrupted) codeword c′ produced by a PPT attacker A we let x′ = (x′1◦. . .◦x
′
k)
with x′i = ECCD(c
′
i) (possibly ⊥) and we let ℓ
′
v,s = ECCD(c
′
v+k) for v ∈ [k] and ℓ
′
k,s,j = ECCD(c
′
2k+j)
for each j ∈ [k]. We say that a node v is green if it is locally consistent i.e.,
ℓ′v,s = H
(
s, x′v ◦ ℓ
′
v1,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓ
′
vd,s
)
,
otherwise, we say that the node is red. We first show that if a green node has the correct label
ℓ′v,s = ℓv,s then it must be the case that x
′
v = xv and ℓ
′
vi,s = ℓvi,s for each i ≤ d — otherwise
A would have found a hash collision! If a graph contains too many red nodes then this is easily
detectable by random sampling and our weak local decoder is allowed to output ⊥ if it detects
any red nodes. Our local decoder will first obtain the final label ℓk,s by random sampling some
labels from ℓ′k,s,1, . . . , ℓ
′
k,s,k and checking to make sure each of these labels is equal to ℓ
′
k,s. If this
check passes then with high probability we must have ℓ′k,s = ℓk,s since the attacker cannot corrupt
too many of these labels. Second, our local decoder will test to make sure that the last node k is
at least α2-good. If this node is not α2-good then we must have found a red node and our weak
decoder may output ⊥; otherwise the last node serves as an anchor point. In particular, since label
ℓk,s = ℓ
′
k,s in this case collision resistance now implies that for any α2-good node v then we must
have x′v = xv and ℓv,s = ℓ
′
v,s since v must be connected to the node k by a green path.
Strong CRLCCs The reason that the previous construction fails to yield a high rate Strong
CRLCCs is that it is possible for an attacker to change every node to a red-node by tampering with
at most O (k · ℓ(λ)/ log k) bits. In particular, since the δ-local expander G has outdegree O (log k)
an attacker who tampers with just O (ℓ(λ)) bits could tamper with one of the labels so that x′v 6= xv.
2The random oracle model is a source of some controversy among cryptographers [KM07, Men12, Gol06, KM15]
with some arguing that the framework can be used to develop cryptographic protocols that are efficient and se-
cure [BR93], while others argue that the methodology is flawed e.g. [BL13, KM15].
7
Now for every w ∈ [k] s.t. G contains the directed edge (v,w) the node w will be red and there are
up to O (log k) = O (log n) such nodes w.
We address this issue by first applying a degree reduction gadget to our family {Gt}
∞
t=1 of δ-local
expanders, where t = O
(
k
ℓ(λ)·log k
)
, to obtain a new family of DAGs as follows: First, we replace
every node u ∈ [t] from Gt with a chain u1, . . . , um of m = O (log t) nodes — we will refer to node
u ∈ [t] as the meta-node for this group. The result is a new graph G with k = m · t nodes. Each
of the nodes u1, . . . , um−1 will have constant indegree and constant outdegree. However, for i < m
we include the directed edges (ui, ui+1) and (ui, um) — the node um will have indeg(um) ∈ Θ(m).
Furthermore, if we have an edge (u, v) in Gt then we will add an edge of the (um, vj) for some
j < m — this will be done in such a way that maintains indeg(vj) ≤ 2 for each j < m. Therefore,
the node um will have outdeg(um) ∈ Θ(log t). We now note that if the label ℓ
′
um,s = ℓum,s and the
node um is green then, by collision resistance, it must be the case that ℓ
′
ui,s = ℓui,s and x
′
ui = xui
for every ui with i ≤ m.
With this observation in mind we tweak our last construction by grouping the values ℓvi,s and
xvi into groups of size m ∈ O (log t) before applying the error correcting code. In particular, given
our input word x divided into k = m · t distinct ℓ(λ)-bit strings xvi for i ≤ m and v ≤ t, our
final output will consist of c = (c1, . . . , c3t) where ci = ECC(x(i−1)m+1, . . . , xim) for i ≤ t and
cv+t = ECC (ℓv1,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓvm,s) and c2t+1 = . . . = c3t = c2t consists of t copies of c2t. The final
codeword c will have length n ∈ O (tm · ℓ(λ)) = O (k · ℓ(λ)) bits. By grouping blocks together we
get the property that an attacker that wants to alter an individual label ℓvi,s must pay to flip at
least Ω (ℓ(λ) ·m) bits of cv+t. Thus, the attacker is significantly restricted in the way he can tamper
with the labels e.g., the attacker cannot tamper with one label in every group.
We say that the meta-node u ∈ [t] = V (Gt) containing nodes u1, . . . , um ∈ V (G) is green if (1)
node um is green, and (2) at least 2m/3 of the nodes u1, . . . , um are green. We say that an edge
(u, v) ∈ E(Gt) in the meta-graph is red if the corresponding edge (um, vj) ∈ E(G) is incident to a
red node; otherwise we say that the edge (u, v) is green. We can then define the green meta-graph
Gg by dropping all red edges from Gt. We remark that, even if we flip a (sufficiently small) constant
fraction of the bits in c we can show that most of the meta-nodes must be green — in fact, most of
these meta-nodes must also be α2-good with respect to the set R of red-nodes. In particular, there
are only two ways to turn a meta-node u red: (1) by paying to flip O (ℓ(λ) ·m) bits in cu or cu+t,
and (2) by corrupting at least m/3 other meta-nodes w such that the directed edge (w, u) is in Gt.
Furthermore, we can introduce the (unknown) set T of tampered meta-nodes where for i ≤ 3t
we say that c˜i is tampered if ECC (ECCD(c˜i)) 6= ci. In this case the hamming distance between
ci and c˜i must be at least O (ℓ(λ) ·m) so the number |T | of tampered meta-nodes cannot be too
large. While the set T is potentially unknown we can still show that most meta-nodes are α-good
with respect to the set R ∪ T . In particular, there must exist some meta-node 3t4 ≤ v ≤ t s.t. v
is α-good with respect to the set R ∪ T . By collision resistance, it follows that for any meta-node
u < v which is connected to v via a green path in Gg we have u /∈ T e.g., u is correct; otherwise we
would have found a hash collision.
While Gt is a δ-local expander the DAG Gg may not be. However, we can show that, for
suitable constants α and δ, if a node u is α-good with respect to the set R∪T then Gg has 2δ-local
expansion around u. Furthermore, if u < v has 4δ-local expansion in Gg then we can prove that
Gg contains a path to the meta-node u. Our local decoder will test whether or not Gg has local
expansion by strategically sampling edges to see if they are green or red. Our decoder will output
⊥ with high probability if u does not have 4δ-local expansion in Gg which is the desired behavior
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since we are not sure if there is a green path connecting u to v in this case. Whenever u does have
2δ-local expansion in Gg the decoder will output ⊥ with negligible probability which is again the
desired behavior since there is a green path from u to v in this case (and, hence, u 6 T has not been
tampered).
Remark 2.7 Recall that in Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.5 we construct a (polylog n, τ, ρ, γ, µ(·))-
Weak CRLCC and a (polylog n, τ, ρ(τ), γ(·), µ(·))-Strong CRLCC where µ(λ) represents the probability
that the adversarial channel outputs a codeword c˜ and challenge index i ∈ [k] that γ(λ)-fools the
local decoder. Intuitively, we can think of µ(λ) as the probability that the codeword generated by the
channel yields a hash collision and we can think of γ(λ) as the probability that we mis-identify a
node (or meta-node) as being α-good. If there are no hash collisions then the only way that the local
decoding algorithm can be fooled is when it mis-identifies a node (or meta-node) as being α-good.
We show that both µ(·) and γ(·) are negligible functions.
3 Construction of Weak-CRLCC
In this section we overview the construction of a constant rate weak-CRLCC scheme. In order to
show the existence of a CRLCC scheme, we need to construct the PPT algorithms Gen, Enc and Dec.
Our construction will use a CRHF Π = (GenH,H). In particular, Gen
(
1λ
)
simply runs GenH
(
1λ
)
to output the public seed s.
The Enc algorithm uses the CRHF to create labels for the vertices of a δ-local expander. We
now define the recursive labeling process for the vertices of any given DAG G using H.
Definition 3.1 (Labeling) Let Σ = {0, 1}ℓ(λ). Given a directed acyclic graph G = ([k], E), a
seed s ← GenH
(
1λ
)
for a collision resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ℓ(λ), and a message
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) ∈ Σ
k we define the labeling of graph G with x, labG,s : Σ
k → Σk as labG,s(x) =
(ℓ1,s, ℓ2,s, . . . , ℓk,s), where
ℓv,s =
{
H(s, xv), indeg(v) = 0
H(s, xv ◦ ℓv1,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓvd,s), 0 < indeg(v) = d,
where v1, . . . , vd are the parents of vertex v in G, according to some predetermined topological order.
We omit the subscripts G, s when the dependency on the graph G and public hash seed H is clear
from context.
3.1 Enc Algorithm
In this section we describe the Enc algorithm which takes as input a seed s ← Gen
(
1λ
)
and
a message x ∈ {0, 1}k, and returns a codeword c ∈ {0, 1}n. For a security parameter λ, let
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ℓ(λ) be a CRHF (see Definition B.3). We will assume that Enc has access toH. In
this section we also let ECC : {0, 1}ℓ(λ) → {0, 1}4·ℓ(λ) be a standard binary code with message length
ℓ(λ) and block length 4 ·ℓ(λ) (such as Justesen code [Jus72]) and let ECCD : {0, 1}4·ℓ(λ) → {0, 1}ℓ(λ)
be the decoder that efficiently decodes from ∆J fraction of errors.
Let s ← Gen(1λ). Let k′ = k/ℓ(λ) and for δ = 1/100, let G = ([k′], E) be a δ-local expander
graph with indegree O (log k′).
Enc(s, x):
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Input: x = (x1 ◦ . . . ◦ xk′) ∈ {0, 1}
k where each xi ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(λ) and k = k′ · ℓ(λ).
Output: c = (c1 ◦ . . . ◦ c3k′) ∈ {0, 1}
n where each ci ∈ {0, 1}
4·ℓ(λ) and n = 4 · 3k′ · ℓ(λ)
• Let labG,s(x) =
(
ℓ1,s, . . . , ℓk′,s
)
be the labeling of the graph G with input x and seed s.
• The codeword c consists of the block encoding of message x, followed by the encoded
labeling of the graph using ECC, followed by k′ copies of encoded ℓk′ . In particular, for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ k′ we have ci = ECC(xi), ci+k′ = ECC(ℓi,s) and ci+2k′ = ECC(ℓk′,s) = c2k′ .
4k′ℓ(λ) bits
Block encoding of
original message x
ECC(x1) . . . ECC(xk′ ) ECC(ℓk′,s)ECC(ℓ1,s) . . . . . . . . . ECC(ℓ5,s)
. . .
ECC(ℓk′,s) ECC(ℓk′,s)
4k′ℓ(λ) bits
ECC(ℓk′,s)
. . .
k′ copies
4k′ℓ(λ) bits
Fig. 1: An example of an encoding with an underlying graph with k′ = k/ℓ(λ) nodes
The parameter δ = 1/100 is an arbitrary simply chosen to satisfy Lemma B.10. Also, note that
the codeword length is n = 4 · 3k′ · ℓ(λ) over the binary alphabet {0, 1}, where ℓ(λ) is the length of
the output of the CRHF H and the original message had length k = k′ · ℓ(λ). Therefore, the rate
k
n of CRLCC scheme obtained from Enc is Θ(1).
3.2 Dec Algorithm
In this section, we detail a randomized algorithm Dec : {0, 1}n × [n] → {⊥} ∪ {0, 1} for Enc :
{0, 1}k → {0, 1}n described in Section 3.1. We assume Dec has access to the same public seed s
used by Enc as well as the δ-local expander used by Enc. We focus on the key ideas first and then
provide the formal description of Dec. The notion of a green node is central to Dec.
Definition 3.2 (Green/red node) Given a (possibly corrupted) codeword w = (w1 ◦ . . . ◦w3k′) ∈
({0, 1}4·ℓ(λ))3k
′
we define x′i = ECCD(wi) ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(λ) for i ≤ k′ and ℓ′v,s = ECCD(wk′+v) for v ≤ k
′
and ℓ′k′,s,i = ECCD(w2k′+i) for i ≤ k
′. We say that a node v ∈ [k′] with parents v1, . . . , vd is green if
the label ℓ′v,s is consistent with the hash of its parent labels i.e., ℓ
′
v,s = H(s, x
′
v ◦ℓ
′
v1,s◦ℓ
′
v2,s◦. . .◦ℓ
′
vd,s
).
A node that is not green is a red node.
We say that a node v is correct if ℓ′v,s = ℓv,s. Lemma 3.3 highlights one of the key reasons why
green nodes are significant in our construction.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose that node v is green and correct (i.e., ℓ′v,s = ℓv,s) and suppose that there is
a directed path from node u to node v consisting entirely of green nodes. Then either the node u is
also correct (i.e., ℓ′u,s = ℓu,s) or the PPT adversary has produced a hash collision.
Proof : If node v is green, then by definition ℓ′v,s = H(s, x
′
v ◦ ℓ
′
v1,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓ
′
vd,s
) where v1, . . . , vd
are the parents of node v. Moreover, if ℓ′v,s is unaltered, then ℓ
′
v,s = ℓv,s, i.e.,
H(s, xv ◦ ℓv1,s ◦ ℓv2,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓvd,s) = H(s, x
′
v ◦ ℓ
′
v1,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓ
′
vd,s
).
10
So, either the adversary has successfully found a hash collision, or xv = x
′
v and ℓvj ,s = ℓ
′
vj ,s for each
j ∈ [d]. Let vj be the parent node of v that lies on the green path from u to v. Assuming we have
no hash collision, we can conclude that the node vj is both correct and green. Extending the same
argument iteratively along the green path from u to vj , we get that either node u must be correct,
or the adversary would have found a hash collision. 
Our local decoder will output ⊥ if it ever detects any red nodes (Note that when the codeword
is not corrupted we will have 0 red nodes).
We now consider two cases. Case 1: The input index i ≥ 8k−4ℓ(λ). This corresponds to a bit
query within the last k′ blocks. From the construction of the code, we know that the last k′ blocks
of the encoding are the same, i.e. c2k′+j = c2k′ for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k
′. In this case, Decw simply queries
some blocks in [2k′, 3k′], decodes them to the nearest codeword and returns the corresponding bit
of the majority codeword. Since the adversary cannot corrupt many blocks beyond the decoding
radius, the majority will return the correct codeword with high probability. See Appendix C.1 for
the formal proof.
Case 2: If the input index i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ), Decw uses the properties of the δ-local expander
graph to detect whether the corresponding label has been tampered or not. If the label is tampered,
then the decoder returns a ⊥ else it returns the i-th of the received vector. Let i′ denote the index
of the node in G associated with the queried bit i i.e., i′ =
⌈
i
4·ℓ(λ)
⌉
mod k′. We check to make sure
that (1) the node k′ is at least α-good (w.r.t. the set of red nodes), and (2) the node i′ is also α-good
(for some α < 1 − 2δ). If either check fails then we will output ⊥. Otherwise, by Lemma 3.3 the
node i′ must be correct (with high probability) since (1) there is a green path connecting any two
α-good nodes in a δ-local expander, and (2) the node k′ must be correct (with high probability).
The core part of the Decw then is the probabilistic procedure to verify that a node v is α-good.
First, it is clear that there is a deterministic procedure IsGreenw(v) that checks whether a given
node v ∈ [k′] is green or not using O (log n) coordinate queries to w (see Lemma C.2 for the formal
statement). Now in order to verify if a node v is α-good, we need to estimate the fraction of
green nodes in any neighborhood of it. This is achieved by designing a tester that accepts v if it is
α/4-good with respect to the set S of red nodes and rejects with high probability if v is not α-good
(formalized in Lemma C.3).
The key observation behind Lemma C.3 is that it suffices to check that
∣∣[v, v + 2j − 1] ∩ S∣∣ ≤
α ·2j/4 for each j ≤ log k′ and that
∣∣[v − 2j + 1, v] ∩ S∣∣ ≤ α ·2j/4 for each j ≤ log k′. For each j we
can sample r = O (polylog k′) random nodes (with replacement) in each of the intervals [v−2j+1, v]
and [v, v + 2j − 1] and use the subroutine IsGreen to count the number of red (resp. green) nodes
in each interval. If for every j ≤ log k′ the number of red nodes is both intervals at most α · 2j/2
we accept. Otherwise, we reject.
4 Strong-CRLCC
In this section, we give an improved construction that locally corrects a majority of input coordi-
nates.
The Barrier: The challenge in correcting a constant fraction of the nodes in the previous
construction is that an adversary that is permitted to change O
(
n
logn
)
symbols can turn all nodes
red in a graph that has outdegree O (log n).
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Key Idea: We overcome the above mentioned barrier using three ideas. First, we run the
original δ-local expander Gt through an indegree reduction gadget to obtain a new graph G with
k′ = t ·m nodes in which almost every node has at most 2 incoming/outgoing edges and each node u
in Gt (called the meta-node) corresponds to m nodes u1, . . . , um in G. During the encoding process
we group the labels.
Second, we group the labels ℓu,s = (ℓu1,s, . . . , ℓum,s) and data values xu = (xu1 , . . . , xum) and
include the encodings cu = ECC(xu) and cu+t = ECC(ℓu,s) in our final codeword. Notice that if we
receive a the codeword c′ 6= c we can first preprocess each block c′i to obtain c˜i = ECC (ECCD(c
′
i)).
Thus, if ECC (ECCD(c′i)) = ci we will say that the block i is untampered — even if c
′
i 6= ci. We say
that a meta-node u is tampered if either of the blocks cu or cu+t were tampered and we use T to
denote the set of tampered meta-nodes. We can show that most meta-nodes are not contained in
the set T since the attacker must alter a constant fraction of the bits in cu or cu+t. In particular,
the attacker has to flip at least Ω (m · ℓ(λ)) bits to tamper any of the meta-nodes. In this way we
can ensure that an attacker must tamper with at least Ω (t ·m · ℓ(λ)) bits to make Ω(t) meta-nodes
red.
Third, we introduce the notion of the green subgraphGg of the meta-graph Gt (see Definition D.6).
In particular, Gg is obtained from Gt by discarding all red-edges (an edge (u, v) ∈ E(Gt) is red if the
corresponding edge (um, vj) ∈ E(G) in G is incident to a red-node). As before a node vi in G is green
if its hash value is locally consistent e.g., ℓ′vi,s = H(s◦x
′
vi ◦ℓ
′
v1i
◦. . .◦ℓ′
vdi
) where v1i , . . . , v
d
i are the par-
ents of node vi in G and for each meta-node u in Gt we define ℓ
′
u =
(
ℓ′u1,s, . . . , ℓ
′
um,s
)
= ECCD(c′u+t)
and x′u =
(
x′u1 , . . . , x
′
um
)
= ECCD(c′u). We say that a meta-node u in Gt is green if at least
2
3 of the
corresponding nodes {u1, . . . , um} in G are green and the last node um is also green (Definition D.2).
We show that the same key properties we used for the construction of Weak-CRLCC still hold with
respect to the meta-nodes i.e., if there is a green path connecting meta-node u to meta-node v and
the meta-node v is untampered (i.e., cv = ECC (ECCD(c
′
v)) and cv+t = ECC
(
ECCD(c′v+t)
)
) then
the meta-node u is also untampered (i.e., cu = ECC (ECCD(c
′
u)) and cu+t = ECC
(
ECCD(c′u+t)
)
) ;
otherwise we would have found a hash collision (Lemma D.16). If we let R denote the subset of
red meta-nodes and if we let T denote the subset of (unknown) tampered meta-nodes we have Gg
contains the graph Gt − (R ∪ T ). One can prove that most meta-nodes are α-good with respect to
the set R ∪ T and that if a meta-node u is α-good with respect to the set R ∪ T then the green
graph Gg also has 2δ-local expansion around the meta-node u (Lemma D.12). Finally, if Gg has
δ′-local expansion around both of the meta-nodes u and v with δ′ ≤ 4δ then there is a green path
connecting u and v (Lemma D.14).
The remaining challenge is that the set T is unknown to the local decoder3. Thus, we cannot
directly test if a node is α-good with respect to R ∪ T . What we can do is develop a test that
accepts all meta-nodes that are α-good with respect to R ∪ T with high probability and rejects
all meta-nodes u that do not have 4δ-local expansion in Gg by sampling the number of red/green
edges in between Ai = [u, u + 2
i − 1] and Bi = [u + 2
i, u + 2i+1 − 1] for i ≥ 1. In particular, we
restrict our attention to edges in the δ-expander graph Hi,δ connecting Ai and Bi in Gt, where
Hi,δ has maximum indegree dδ for some constant dδ which depends on δ. If Gg is not a 4δ-local
expansion around u then for some interval i a large number of red edges between Ai and Bi must
have been removed — at least c2δ2
i red edges out of at most 2i × dδ edges in Hi,δ. By contrast, if
u is α-good with respect to R ∪ T then we can show that at most c1α2
idδ edges are deleted. For
3By contrast, it is easy to check if a node (resp. meta-node) is red/green by checking if the hash value(s) are
locally consistent.
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a suitably small value of α < δdδ we can ensure that c1α2
idδ < 4c2δ2
i. Thus, our tester can simply
sample random edges in Hi,δ and accept if and only the observed fraction fr,i of red edges is at
most, say, 2c1α2
idδ (Lemma D.11).
The full description of the decoder is in Appendix D.
Graph Degree Reduction
We now describe our procedure ReduceDegree that takes as input a t node δ-local expander DAG
G0 with indegree m = O(log t) and outputs a new graph G with mt nodes. G has the property
that most nodes have indegree two.
ReduceDegree: (Let G0 be a δ-local expander.)
Input: Graph G0 with t vertices and m = max{indeg(G0), outdeg(G0)}+ 1
Output: Graph G with m · t vertices.
• For each node u in G0 we add m nodes u1, . . . , um to G. Along with each of the directed
edges (ui, ui+1) and (ui, um) for i < m.
• For each directed edge (u, v) in G0 we connect the final node um to the first node vj that
currently has indegree at most 1.
We call G0 the meta-graph of G and we refer to nodes in G0 as meta-nodes. In particular, the
meta-node u ∈ V (G0) corresponds to the simple nodes u1, . . . , um ∈ V (G). Notice that for two
meta-nodes u < v ∈ V (G0) there is an edge (u, v) ∈ E(G0) in the meta-graph if and only if G has
an edge of the form (um, vi) for some i ≤ m. While our encoding algorithm will use the graph G
to generate the labeling, it will be helpful to reason about meta-nodes in our analysis since the
meta-graph G0 is a δ-local expander.
· · · u · · · v − 1 v
u2 umu1 · · · · · · v2 vmv1 · · ·· · ·
G0
G
Fig. 2: An example of a degree reduction graph
4.1 Enc Algorithm
In this section we describe the Enc algorithm which takes as input a seed s← Gen
(
1λ
)
and a message
x ∈ {0, 1}k and returns a codeword c ∈ {0, 1}n. For a security parameter λ, let H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}ℓ(λ) be a CRHF (see Definition B.3). Recall that, ECC and ECCD denote the encoding and
decoding algorithms of a good code of rate R = R(τ) that can decode efficiently from some constant
∆J = ∆J(τ) fraction of errors (Note: as τ → 0 we have ∆J(τ)→ 0 and R(τ)→ 1).
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Let β = β(τ) > 0 be a parameter which can be tuned. For t = O
(
k
βℓ(λ)·log k
)
, let G0 = ([t], E)
be a δ-local expander graph on t vertices and degree (indegree and outdegree) m = O (log t) where
δ = δ(τ) < 14 is a parameter than can be tuned as needed
4. Let G := ReduceDegree(G0) be the
graph with k′ := kβℓ(λ) nodes output by the degree reducing procedure applied to G0. Crucially,
the graph has the property that for α = α(τ) < 1− 2δ(τ) and any red/green coloring of the nodes
of the graph that any pair of α-good meta-nodes with respect to the set T of tampered nodes are
connected by a green path.
Let s← Gen(1λ)
Enc(s, x):
Input: x = (x1 ◦ . . . ◦ xk′) ∈
(
{0, 1}βℓ(λ)
)k′
, where k = k′ · βℓ(λ)
Output: c = (c1 ◦ . . . ◦ c3t) ∈ {0, 1}
n, where t = k′/m and n = tmℓ(λ)R · (β + 2).
• Let (ℓ11,s, . . . , ℓ1m,s, . . . , ℓt1,s . . . , ℓtm,s) = labG,s(x) be the labeling of the graph G with
input x using the CRHF, H (see Definition 3.1).
• Let U1 := (ℓ11,s ◦ ℓ12,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓ1m,s), . . . , Ut := (ℓt1,s ◦ ℓt2,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓtm,s).
• Let T1 := (x1 ◦ x2 ◦ . . . ◦ xm), . . . , Tt := (x(t−1)m+1 ◦ x(t−1)m+2 ◦ . . . ◦ xtm).
• The codeword c consists of the encoding of groups of message bits, followed by encoding
using ECC of groups of labels, followed by t = k
′
m copies of the last encoding.
c = (ECC(T1) ◦ ECC(T2) ◦ . . . ◦ ECC(Tt) ◦ ECC(U1) ◦ ECC(U2) ◦ . . . ◦ ECC(Ut)◦
ECC(Ut) ◦ . . . ◦ ECC(Ut)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t times
),
where ECC(Ui) = ECC(ℓi1,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓim,s) for all i ∈ [t].
The codeword c = Enc(x) consists of 3 parts. The first k/R bits correspond to the message
symbols x passed m ·βℓ(λ) bits at a time through ECC of rate R. The next k/(βR) bits correspond
to t codewords ECC(Uj), and finally the last k/(βR) bits correspond to the repetitions of the final
ECC codeword, ECC(Ut). Therefore the length of any codeword produced by Enc is n =
k
R ·
β+2
β .
The information rate of the constructed code is therefore R ·
(
β
β+2
)
. Therefore appropriately choos-
ing the parameters β and R, we get the rate of the CRLCC approaching 1.
Strong CRLCC Decoder: We can show that for any w ∈ {0, 1}n with dist(w, c) ≤ ∆J ·k4 the
number of tampered meta-nodes T ⊂ V (G0) is very small. If let t(τ) denote the maximum number
of meta-nodes v that the attacker can either corrupt or ensure that v is not α-good with respect
to T then it can be shown that t(τ)/t→ 0 as τ → 0 i.e., almost all of the meta-nodes u are α-good
with respect to the set T of tampered meta-nodes and that any such node u that has 2δ-local
expansion in the green subgraph Gg. We also show that any meta-node v < t− t(τ) − 1 that has
4As δ grows smaller the degree of G0 increases. In particular, we have indeg(G0) = dδ log n where dδ is some
constant which depends on δ — as δ decreases dδ increases. We will also have m = dδ log n nodes in each metanode
of G so m increases as δ decreases. This will increase the locality of our decoding algorithm, but only by a constant
factor.
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δ′-local expansion with δ′ ≤ 4δ must also be correct because at least one of the last t(τ) + 1 nodes
must be α-good and correct and v will be connected to this node via an all green path since we have
4δ-local expansion around both nodes in the green subgraph Gg. While the set T is potentially
unknown it is possible to test which (with high probability) accepts all α-good meta-nodes and
(with high probability) rejects any meta-node u with the property that the green subgraph Gg does
not have 4δ-local expansion around u. We can distinguish between the two cases by strategically
sampling edges in each of the intervals Ai = [u, u + 2
i − 1] and Bi = [u + 2
i, u + 2i+1 − 1]. The
original meta-graph G0 contains a δ-bipartite expander Hi connecting Ai and Bi. If u does not
have 4δ-local expansion in Gg then for some i a large fraction of the edges in Hi must be red. By
contrast, if u is α-good with respect to T then we can show that the number of red edges in Hi will
be much smaller. Thus, we can ensure that we can decode at least ρ(τ) ≥ (1− 2× t(τ)/t) fraction
of the bits in the original codeword so that ρ(τ)→ 1 as τ → 0. With this observation it is relatively
straightforward to extend the ideas from the previous section to build a strong Dec with locality
O (polylog n). A full description of the strong CRLCC decoder can be found in Appendix D.
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A Expanded Discussion of Related Work
Classical LDCs/LCCs and Relaxed Variants in the Hamming channel The current best
constructions for LDCs/LCCs can achieve any constant rate R < 1, any constant relative dis-
tance (i.e., minimum Hamming distance between codewords) δ < 1 − R, and query complexity
O
(
2
√
logn log logn
)
[KMRS17]. In the constant query complexity regime, for q ≥ 3, the best codes
achieve blocklength subexponential in the message length [Yek08, Efr12, DGY11]. For q = 2,
Kerenidis and deWolf [KdW04] show an exponential in k lower bound for the blocklength of any
LDC.
A notion similar to RLDCs, called Locally Decode/Reject code, was studied by Moshkovitz
and Raz [MR10] in the context of building better PCPs. The notion concerns decoding batches of
coordinates jointly, and it allows as output a list of possible messages. In the context of simplifying
the proofs in [MR10], a related notion of decodable PCPs was studied in [DH09].
Non-Local Codes in Computationally Bounded Channels In their initial works in the
computationally bounded channel, Lipton [Lip94] and Ding, Gopalan and Lipton [DGL04] obtain
error-correcting codes uniquely decodable (in the classical, global setting) with error rates beyond
what is possible in the adversarial Hamming channel. Their model requires that the sender and
receiver share a secret random string, unknown to the channel. This is a strong cryptographic
assumption, as the model is unsuitable to common settings such as message broadcast. Micali
et al. [MPSW05] address this drawback by proposing public-key error-correcting codes against com-
putationally bounded channels. Their model is based on the observation that if one starts with
a code that is list-decodable, by encoding messages using a secret key and digitally signing them,
one can prevent a PPT channel from producing valid signatures, while allowing the receiver to pick
the unique message from the list with a valid signature. In follow-up work, Guruswami and Smith
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[GS16] removes the public-key setup, and obtains optimal rate error-correcting codes for channels
that can be described by simple circuits. Their channels are either “oblivious”, namely the error is
independent of the actual message being sent, or they are describable by polynomial size circuits.
Their results are based on the idea that the sender can choose a permutation and a “blinding
factor” that are then embedded into the codeword together with the message. The channel cannot
distinguish the hidden information since it operates with low complexity, while the receiver can.
LDCs in Computationally Bounded Channels The notion of LDCs over computationally
bounded channels was introduced in [OPS07], where the authors define private LDCs. In these
constructions the sender and the receiver share a private key. They obtain codes of constant rate
and O (polylogλ) query complexity, where λ is the security parameter. Hemenway and Ostrovsky
[HO08] build LDCs in the public-key model, and obtain codes of constant rate, and O
(
λ2
)
locality.
Hemenway et al. [HOSW11] improve on these results and obtain public-key LDCs with constant
rate, constant error rate and O (λ) locality, which work under a weaker cryptographic assumption
than that of [HO08].
Other Applications of Depth-Robust Graphs Depth-robust graphs have found many appli-
cations in cryptography. These applications includes the construction of memory hard functions
with provably high cumulative memory complexity [AS15, AB16, ABP17, ABH17, BZ17], sustained
space complexity [ABP18] and bandwidth hardness [BRZ18, RD17]. Depth robust graphs have also
been used to construct proofs of space [DFKP15] and they were also used in the first construction
of a proof of sequential work [MMV13] although Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18] found an alternate
construction of a Proofs-Of-Sequential Work protocol that does not involve depth-robust graphs.
Finally, depth-robust graphs have also been used to derive cumulative space in the black-white
pebble game [AdNV17, ABP18] which is of interest in the study of proof complexity. To the best of
our knowledge we are the first to apply depth-robust graphs (more specifically δ-local expanders)
in the area of coding theory to construct (relaxed) locally correctable codes.
B Additional Background: Justesen Codes, CRHFs and Local
Expanders
We use the notation [n] to represent the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For any x, y ∈ Σn, let dist(x) denote the
Hamming weight of x, i.e. the number of non-zero coordinates of x. Let dist(x, y) = dist(x − y)
denote the Hamming distance between the vectors x and y. For any vector x ∈ Σn, let x[i] be the
ith coordinate of x. We also let x ◦ y denote the concatenation of x with y.
We denote a directed acyclic graph G with n vertices labelled in topological order by G =
([n], E). A node v ∈ V has indegree δ = indeg(v) if there exist δ incoming edges δ = |(V ×{v})∩E|.
Thus, we say that graph G has indegree δ = indeg(G) if the maximum indegree of any node of G
is δ. A node with indegree 0 is called a source node and a node with no outgoing edges is called a
sink. A node v ∈ V has outdegree δ = outdeg(v) if there exist δ outgoing edges δ = |(V ×{v})∩E|.
Thus, we say that graph G has outdegree δ = outdeg(G) if the maximum outdegree of any node of
G is δ. Finally, we say that graph G has degree δ = deg(G) if the maximum degree of any node of
G is δ, or equivalently maxv∈V outdeg(v)+ indeg(v) = δ. We use parentsG(v) = {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}
to denote the parents of a node v ∈ V . We will often consider graphs obtained from other graphs
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by removing subsets of nodes. Therefore if S ⊂ V , then we denote by G − S the DAG obtained
from G by removing nodes S and incident edges.
Let C be a (n, k) code that maps any k-length message over alphabet Σ to a unique n-length
codeword over alphabet Σ. We say n is the block length of the code, and k/n is the information
rate. Let Enc : Σk → Σn denote the encoding map of C. We define the minimum distance of C to
be the quantity minc1,c2∈C dist(c1, c2) and the relative minimum distance of C to be the quantity
minc1,c2∈C
dist(c1,c2)
n .
We shall use Enc and Dec to refer to the encoding and decoding algorithms of our construction,
and ECC and ECCD to refer to the encoding and decoding algorithms for a binary code CJ with
constant rate and relative distance. We will use Justesen codes [Jus72] in what follows.
Theorem B.1 [Jus72] For any 0 < R < 1, there exist binary linear codes of rate R, that are
efficiently decodable from ∆J(R) fraction of errors, where ∆J(R) is a function that only depends
on R.
Collision Resistant Hash Functions (CRHF)
Our code constructions involve the use of collision-resistant hash functions. We use the following
definitions from Katz and Lindell [KL14].
Definition B.2 [KL14, Definition 4.11] A hash function with alphabet Σ and blocklength ℓ(.) is a
pair Π = (GenH,H) of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms satisfying:
• GenH is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1λ and outputs a
public seed s ∈ {0, 1}∗, where the security parameter 1λ is implicit in the string s.
• H is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a seed s and a string Σ∗ and outputs a
string H(s, x) ∈ Σℓ(λ).
A collision resistant hash function can be defined using the following experiment for a hash function
Π = (GenH,H), an adversary A, and a security parameter λ:
The collision-finding experiment Hash− collA,Π(λ):
(1) s← GenH(1λ)
(2) (x, x′)← A(s)
(3) The output of the experiment is 1 if and only if A successfully finds a collision, i.e.
x 6= x′ and H(s, x) = H(s, x′).
Then this experiment implicitly defines a collision resistant hash function.
Definition B.3 [KL14, Definition 4.12] A hash function Π = (GenH,H) is collision resistant if
for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A there exists a negligible function negl such that
Pr [Hash− collA,Π(λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ).
21
Background on δ-Local Expander Graphs
We now begin to describe the underlying DAGs in our code construction. We first define the class
of graphs δ-expanders and δ-local expanders.
Definition B.4 Let δ > 0. A bipartite graph G = (U, V,E) is called a δ-expander if for allM1 ⊆ U ,
M2 ⊆ V such that |M1| ≥ δ|U | and |M2| ≥ δ|V |, there exists an edge e ∈M1 ×M2.
Definition B.5 Let δ > 0 and G = ([n], E) be a directed acyclic graph. G is called a δ-local
expander if for every vertex x ∈ [n] and every r ≤ min{x, n − x}, the bipartite graph induced by
U = [x, . . . , x+ r − 1] and V = [x+ r, . . . , x+ 2r − 1] is a δ-expander.
Theorem B.6, due to Alwen et al. [ABP18], states that δ-local expanders exist with degree O (log n).
Theorem B.6 [ABP18] For any n > 0, δ > 0, there exists a δ-local expander G = ([n], E) with
indegree O (log n) and outdegree O (log n).
The construction of Alwen et al. [ABP18] is probabilistic. In particular, they show that there is a
random distribution over DAGs such that any sample from this distribution is a δ-local expander
with high probability. The randomized construction of Alwen et al. [ABP18] closely follows an
earlier construction of Erdos et al. [EGS75] 5.
We now list some properties of the δ-local expander graphs shown in [ABP18]. We will use
these properties to construct the Dec algorithm for the CRLCC scheme.
Definition B.7 (α-good node) Let G = ([n], E) be a DAG and let S ⊆ [n] be a subset of vertices.
Let 0 < c < 1. We say v ∈ [n]− S is α-good under S if for all r > 0:
|[v − r + 1, v] ∩ S| ≤ αr, |[v, v + r − 1] ∩ S| ≤ αr.
Intuitively, we can view the subset S to be a set of “deleted” vertices. A vertex in the remaining
graph is called α-good if at most α fraction of vertices in any of its neighborhood are contained
in the deleted set. In our case, we will ultimately define S to be the nodes with the inconsistent
labels.
The following result of [ABP18] shows that in any DAG G, even if we deleted a constant fraction
of vertices, there still remain a constant fraction of vertices that are α-good.
Lemma B.8 (Lemma 4.4 in [ABP18]) Let G = ([n], E) be a directed acyclic graph. For any
S ⊂ [n] and any 0 < α < 1, at least n− |S|
(
2−α
α
)
nodes in G− S are α-good under S.
Claim B.9 rephrases a claim from [ABP18]. The only difference is that [ABP18] did not define
the phrase “G is a δ-local expander around node x” since the DAG G they consider is assumed to
satisfy this property for all nodes x. However, their proof only relies on the fact that G is a δ-local
expander around node x.
5While Alwen et al. [ABP18] only analyze the indegree of this construction it is trivial to see that the outdegree is
also O (log n) since the construction of Erdos et al. [EGS75] overlays multiple bipartite expander graphs on top of the
nodes V = [n]. Each bipartite expander graph has indeg, outdeg ∈ O (1) and each node is associated with O (log n)
expanders.
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Claim B.9 ([ABP18]) Let G = (V = [n], E) be a δ-local expander around x and suppose that
x ∈ [n] is a α-good node under S ⊆ [n]. Let r > 0 be given. If α < γ/2 then all but 2δr of the
nodes in I∗r (x)\S are reachable from x in G − S. Similarly, x can be reached from all but 2δr of
the nodes in Ir(x)\S. In particular, if δ < 1/4 then more than half of the nodes in I
∗
r (x)\S (resp.
in Ir(x) \ S) are reachable from x (resp. x is reachable from) in G− S.
Alwen et al. [ABP18] also show that in a δ-local expander graph G any two α-good vertices in
G − S are connected. As was the case for Claim B.9 the only difference between our statement
of Lemma B.10 and [ABP18] is that [ABP18] did not define the phrase “G is a δ-local expander
around node x” since the DAG G they consider is assumed to satisfy this property for all nodes x.
However, their proof only relies on the fact that G is a δ-local expander around nodes u and v.
Lemma B.10 (Lemma 4.3 in [ABP18]) Let G = ([n], E) be a δ-local expander around nodes
u and v, S ⊆ [n] and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. If δ < min((1 − α)/2, 1/4), and nodes u and v are α-good with
respect to S then u and v are connected in G− S.
C Weak CRLCC Decoder
C.1 Query Procedure for i ≥ 8k − 4ℓ(λ)
In this section, we describe the procedure for recovering a coordinate for input i ≥ 8k − 4ℓ(λ).
We show that regardless of the underlying graph, any adversary that can change at most ∆Jk4
coordinates of a codeword obtained from Enc, cannot prevent outputting ⊥ or the correct bit for a
query on the last k′ + 1 blocks.
Consider the following algorithm Decw1 (s, i) for any i ≥ 8k − 4ℓ(λ):
Decw1 : Input : Index i ∈ [n] such that i ≥ 8k − 4ℓ(λ).
(1) Sample Θ
(
log3 k
ℓ(λ)
)
blocks {wt} of w for t between 2k
′ and 3k′ uniformly at random.
(2) Decode each of the queried blocks wt to the corrected codeword, ct := ECC(ECCD(wt)).
(could possibly be a ⊥ if ECCD fails to decode).
(3) Let cmaj = majority{ct} be the codeword of ECC which occurs majority of the times in
Step (2) above.
(4) Output symbol (i mod 4ℓ(λ)) of cmaj .
We show in Lemma C.1 that Pr [Decw1 (s, i) = c[i]] ≥ 1 − negl(n) and uses at most O
(
log3 n
)
queries.
Lemma C.1 Let Enc be as described in Section 3.1. For any 8k − 4ℓ(λ) ≤ i ≤ n, Decw1 does the
following:
(1) For any x ∈ {0, 1}k and c = Enc(s, x), it holds that Decc1(s, i) = c[i].
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(2) For any x ∈ {0, 1}k, c = Enc(s, x) and w ∈ {0, 1}n generated by any PPT adversary such that
dist(c, w) ≤ ∆Jk4 , it holds that
Pr [Decw1 (s, i) = c[i]] ≥ 1−
1
nlog
2 n
.
Moreover, Decw1 makes at most O
(
log3 n
)
queries to w.
Proof : First, note that for any codeword obtained from Enc, Dec1 will always output the correct
symbol. Let w be the received word which is obtained by altering at most ∆Jk4 coordinates of some
codeword c obtained from Enc, i.e., 0 < dist(c, w) ≤ ∆Jk4 . From Enc, we know that the last k
′
blocks of any codeword are exactly the same. Since dist(c, w) ≤ ∆Jk4 , at most
1
4 fraction of these
blocks are modified in more than ∆J fraction of their coordinates. Therefore, at least
3
4 fraction
of the last k′ blocks can be corrected to a unique codeword closest to them. Thus, each query
finds an correct codeword block with probability at least 34 . Then by standard Chernoff bounds,
the probability that the majority of the Θ
(
log3 k
ℓ(λ)
)
queries are correct is at least 1− e−Ω(ns), where
ns = Θ
(
log3 k
ℓ(λ)
)
is the number of sampled blocks.
Since Dec1 queries O
(
log3 k
ℓ(λ)
)
blocks each of length 4ℓ(λ) bits, the complexity of Dec1 is at most
O
(
log3 k
)
= O
(
log3 n
)
. 
C.2 Query Procedure for i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ)
In this section, we describe the algorithm for recovering a coordinate for input i < 8k−4ℓ(λ). Before
we describe the algorithm, we need a few definitions and properties of the code we constructed in
Section 3.1.
Recall that for a codeword obtained from Enc, the first k′ blocks of length 4ℓ(λ) each, corre-
sponds to the encoding of the message symbols, and the next k′ blocks correspond to the encoding
of labels of the nodes of a fixed δ-local expander graph G = ([k′], E) generated using the k′ message
blocks.
Recall that we say that a node v is green if it is locally consistent with the hash of its parents.
In the next lemma, we describe an algorithm which verifies whether a given node of G is green with
respect to the labels obtained from the received vector w ∈ {0, 1}n. From the definition of a green
node it follows that we need to query only the labels of the parents of a given vertex v to verify
if it is green. Since the indegree of G is O (log k′), we can check if a particular node is green by
making at most O (log k′) block queries to w. We now formalize the verification procedure.
Lemma C.2 Let G = ([k′], E) be δ-local expander with indegree O (log k′) used by Enc and let
w = (w1, . . . , w3k′) ∈ {0, 1}
n be the corrupted word obtained from the PPT adversary. There exists
an algorithm IsGreen that uses O (ℓ(λ) log (n/ℓ(λ))) coordinate queries to w and outputs whether a
given node v ∈ [k′] of G is green or not.
Proof : We claim the following algorithm achieves the desired properties:
24
IsGreen: Input: Node v ∈ [k′] of G with indegree d = O (log k′).
(1) Query and decode the blocks wk′+vj for all vj ∈ parentsG(v). Let ℓ
′
k′+vj
:= ECCD(wk′+vj ).
Return ‘Red’ if ECCD fails on any input.
(2) Query and decode the block wv. Let x
′
v := ECCD(wv). Return ‘Red’ if ECCD fails.
(3) If ECCD(wk′+v) = H(s, x
′
v ◦ wk′+v1 ◦ wk′+v2 ◦ · · · ◦ wk′+vd), where vj ∈ parentsG(v) for
j ∈ [d], then output ‘Green’
(4) Else output ‘Red’.
IsGreen outputs whether or not the label of node v, i.e. ECCD(wk′+v), is green by querying at
most O (log k′) blocks of w. Since each block is 4ℓ(λ) bits long, and k′ = k/ℓ(λ) = O (n/ℓ(λ)), the
number of bits queried is equivalently O (ℓ(λ) log (n/ℓ(λ))). 
Let w ∈ {0, 1}n be the received word obtained from the PPT adversary. Let S ⊆ [k′] be the
set of red nodes of G with respect to its labeling obtained from w. Let 0 < α < 1. Recall from
Definition B.7 that we call a node i ∈ [k′] of G to be α-good under the set S ⊆ [k′] if for all r > 0,
the number of nodes of S in any r-sized neighborhood of i is at most α·r. We now give an algorithm
to locally verify if a given node of G is α-good with high probability.
Lemma C.3 For any α < 34 , there exists a procedure that makes O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ
(
n
ℓ(λ)
))
coordinate
queries to w and for any node i ∈ [k′] of G does the following:
• Accepts if i is α4 -good under S with probability 1− negl(n).
• Rejects if i is not α-good under S with probability 1− negl(n).
Proof : Consider the following algorithm IsGood, where S is defined to be the set of red nodes:
IsGood: Input: Node i ∈ [k′] of G, α < 34 , space parameter ǫ > 0.
(1) If i is not green, then Reject.
(2) For every p ∈ {1, . . . , log k′} do:
• Sample log1+ǫ k′ nodes U1p ⊆ [i−2p+1, i] and U2p ⊆ [i, i+2p−1] with replacement.
• If the fraction of red nodes in U1p or U2p is larger than
3α
8 , then Reject.
(3) Accept otherwise.
Note that IsGood samples at most O
(
log2+ǫ k′
)
nodes of G and for each of those nodes, we
check if it is green. Using Algorithm IsGreen described in Lemma C.2, we can verify if a node is
green using only O (log k′) block queries to w. Therefore the number of coordinates of w queried
by IsGood is at most O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ))
)
.
To prove the correctness, first observe that if the node i is red, then i ∈ S and therefore by
definition it is not α-good for any α. IsGood always rejects such nodes.
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Suppose node i is α/4-good. Then any r-sized neighborhoods of i, i.e [i−r+1, i] and [i, i+r−1]
have at most α·r/4 red nodes. In particular, for all p ∈ [log k′], the neighborhoods U1p = [i−2p+1, i]
and U2p = [i, i + 2
p − 1] contain at most α/4 fraction of red nodes. So, on sampling uniformly
random log1+ǫ k′ vertices from these intervals, the probability that we see more than 3α/8 fraction
of red nodes is at most e−
α
12
log1+ǫ k′ which follows from Chernoff bounds. Taking a union bound over
all log k′ intervals, IsGood accepts any α/4-good node with probability at least 1 − e−
α
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log1+ǫ(k′).
Therefore IsGood accepts any α/4-good node with probability at least 1 − negl(k′) = 1 − negl(n)
for ℓ(λ) = polylog n.
In order to show that the algorithm rejects any node which is not α-good with high probability,
we first show that any node which is not α-good under S is not α/2-good for some interval of size
2p, p > 0. The rejection probability then follows from Chernoff bounds. If node i is not α-good
under S, then there exists a neighborhood I of i such that the number of red nodes in I is at least
α|I|. Let R(X) denote the number of red nodes for some subset X ⊆ V . Let U1 ⊆ I ⊆ U2 where
|U1| = 2
p∗ and |U2| = 2
p∗+1 for some integer p∗ > 0. Then
R(U2) ≥ R(I)
∗
≥ α|I| ≥ α|U1| = α · 2
p∗ =
α
2
· 2p
∗+1.
where the inequality (*) results from i not being α-good. So, the probability that this interval
goes undetected by IsGood is at most e−
α
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log1+ǫ k′ . Therefore, IsGood rejects any node which is not
α-good with probability at least 1− negl(k′). 
Now, we describe the decoding procedure for any index i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ) using the IsGood proce-
dure. Let (w, i, x) be the challenge provided by any PPT adversary such that dist(c, w) ≤ τ , where
c = Enc(x).
Recall from the encoding procedure in , the first 8k − 4ℓ(λ) bits correspond to either the the
encoding of the message bits using ECC (the first 4k bits) or the encoding of the labels of the nodes
the δ-local expander (the next 4k bits). For any index query corresponding to the encoding of the
label bits (i > 4k), we check if the label is tampered with or not. If it is not tampered, then the
decoder returns the received bit, else it returns a ⊥. For any i ≤ 4k, the decoder first tests if its
corresponding label is tampered. If it is not tampered, then the decoder returns the corresponding
received bit, else it returns a ⊥.
Recall that using Algorithm Dec1 we can successfully correct any index i ≥ 8k−4ℓ(λ). Therefore,
to design Dec2, we assume the correctness of node k
′ using Dec1. The procedure Dec2 first checks
whether nodes i and node k′ are α-good for some α < 3/4. If they are both α-good, then by
Lemma B.10 there is a path of green nodes connecting i and node k′. Node k′ now serves as an
anchor point by being both α-good and correct due to the repetition code, so then Lemma 3.3
implies node i is also unaltered. We now formalize this and describe Dec2 in Lemma C.4.
Lemma C.4 Let Enc be as described in Section 3.1. For any 1 ≤ i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ), there exists a
procedure Dec2 with the following properties:
(1) For any x ∈ {0, 1}k and c = Enc(s, x), Decc2(s, i) = c[i].
(2) For any x ∈ {0, 1}k, c = Enc(s, x) and w ∈ {0, 1}n generated by any PPT adversary such that
dist(c, w) ≤ ∆Jk4 ,
Pr [Decw2 (s, i) ∈ {c[i],⊥}] ≥ 1− negl(n).
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Moreover, Dec2 makes at most O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ))
)
queries to input w for any constant ǫ > 0.
Proof : We claim the following procedure has the desired properties.
Decw2 : Input: Index i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ).
(1) Let S be the set of red nodes of G with respect to the labels obtained from w.
(2) Let α < 34 .
(3) Reconstruct the label of k′-th node, ℓk′,s using a call to Dec1.
(4) If node k′ of G with label ℓk′,s and node
⌈
i
4·ℓ(λ)
⌉
mod k′ are α-good under S, then return
wi,
(5) Else return ⊥.
First we show that the query complexity of Dec2 is at most O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ))
)
. Observe that
Dec1 described in Lemma C.1 uses majority decoding to reconstruct the entire block w2k′+j, for any
0 ≤ j ≤ k′−1. Moreover, it uses at most O
(
log3 n
)
coordinate queries to w in order to reconstruct
any of the last k′ blocks with 1 − negl(n). Therefore we can assume that after Step (3), the label
ℓk′,s of G is correct with very high probability. Also, using the procedure described in Lemma C.3,
we can check if both the nodes k′ and i are α-good using at most O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ))
)
queries
for any ǫ > 0. Therefore the query complexity of Dec2 is O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ))
)
.
To show (1), observe that if w is a codeword produced by Enc, then the label ℓk′,s is reconstructed
correctly with probability 1 by Dec1 in the first step. Also since S = ∅, all the nodes of G are
α-good. Therefore, Dec2 always returns the correct codeword symbol.
Now, if w is any string produced by a PPT adversary such that 0 < dist(c, w) ≤ ∆Jk4 , then from
the analysis of Dec1 in Lemma C.1, we know that ℓk′,s is reconstructed correctly with probability
at least 1 − negl(n). If both nodes i and k′ of G are α-good under S, then by Lemma B.10, we
know that there exists a path in G from node i to node k′ in G which consists of only green nodes.
So, node i is a green ancestor of node k′. The correctness of wi then follows from Lemma 3.3. 
We now combine the two correctors described above to obtain our local corrector Dec as follows:
Decw: Input : Index i.
(1) If i ≥ 8k − 4ℓ(λ), return Decw1 (s, i)
(2) Else return Decw2 (s, i).
Lemma C.5 Let Enc be as described in Section 3.1. For any i ∈ [n], Dec does the following:
(1) For any x ∈ {0, 1}k and c = Enc(s, x), Decc(s, i) = c[i].
(2) For any x ∈ {0, 1}k, c = Enc(s, x) and w ∈ {0, 1}n generated by any PPT adversary such that
dist(c, w) ≤ ∆Jk4 ,
Pr [Decw(s, i) ∈ {c[i],⊥}] ≥ 1− negl(n).
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Moreover, Dec makes at most O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ))
)
queries to input w for any constant ǫ > 0.
Proof : The proof follows from Lemma C.4 and Lemma C.1. Since n = 3k′ · 4ℓ(λ), any query
on an index i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ) is handled by Lemma C.4 while a query on an index i ≥ 8k − 4ℓ(λ)
is handled by Lemma C.1. Since each scenario uses at most O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ))
)
queries, the
algorithm also uses O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ))
)
queries. Note that for ℓ(λ) = polylog n, the query
complexity of the decoder is polylogn. 
We now show that our construction Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a CRLCC scheme.
Proof of Theorem 2.4: Gen on input a security parameter λ simulates the generator algorithm
GenH of the CRHF to output a random seed s.
Consider s← Gen(1λ), Enc described in Section 3.1 and the decoder Dec described in Section 3.2
above. We claim that the triple Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a CRLCC scheme.
From the construction of Enc, we know that the block length of a codeword produced by Enc is
n = 3k′ · 4 · ℓ(λ) = 12k. Therefore, the information rate of the CRLCC is O (1).
From Lemma C.5 we know that on input (w, i, x) generated by any PPT adversary such that
dist(Enc(x), w) ≤ ∆Jk4 , Dec
w queries at most O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ))
)
coordinates of w and returns
d ∈ {Enc(x)[i],⊥} with probability at least 1 − negl(n). Also, Dec on input any valid encoding
(Enc(x), i, x) returns Enc(x)[i] with probability 1. 
D Strong CRLCC Decoder
Recall that the codeword c = Enc(x) consists of 3 parts of t blocks each. The first k/R bits (first t
blocks) correspond to the message symbols x passed m · βℓ(λ) bits at a time through ECC of rate
R. The next k/(βR) bits (second set of t blocks) correspond to t codewords ECC(Uj), and finally
the last k/(βR) bits (third set of t blocks) correspond to the repetitions of the final ECC codeword,
ECC(Ut).
Note: For simplicity of presentation, we let β = 1 and R = 1/4 for the discussion of the decoder
in this section. The proof extends similarly for other values of the parameters β and R.
Observe that at the end of the construction, each meta-node contains exactly one node (i.e.
the final node) with indegree more than 2 (it has indegree m) and outdegree more than 2 (it has
outdegree O (m)).
Similar to the decoder Dec of Section 3.2, the current decoding procedure has separate subrou-
tine to handle indices corresponding to the first 2t − 1 blocks and a separate decoding procedure
for the remaining indices. In the following, we define map(i) to be the meta-node corresponding to
index i. That is,
map(i) =


⌈
i
4mℓ(λ)
⌉
, i ≤ 4k⌈
i−4k
4mℓ(λ)
⌉
, 4k < i ≤ 8k,
t, i > 8k
Before we describe the decoder for the Strong CRLCC, we need a few definitions and supporting
lemmas.
The following claim follows from the construction of the metagraph G0 which was shown in
[ABP18]. The bounded outdegree allows us to test meta-nodes with a bounded (in this case
logarithmic) number of queries.
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Claim D.1 outdeg(G0) = Θ(log k).
Let c = (c1 ◦ . . . ◦ c3t) = Enc(s, x). Recall that for a meta-node u ∈ [t] = V (G0) we have
cu = ECC(x(u−1)m+1 ◦ . . . ◦xum) and cu+t = ECC(ℓu1,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓum,s). Given a (possibly) corrupted c
′
codeword we let c˜i = ECC(ECCD(c
′
i)). We note that if c
′
i and ci are sufficiently close then we will al-
ways have c˜i = ci. If c˜i 6= ci we say that the block i was tampered and if c˜i = ci we say that the block
is correct. We let T ⊆ [t− 1] denote the set of all nodes u < t (excluding the last node t) with the
property that either blocks u or u+ t were tampered. We also let
(
ℓ′u1,s ◦ . . . ◦ ℓ
′
um,s
)
= ECCD(cu+t)
and
(
x(u−1)m+1 ◦ . . . ◦ xum
)
= ECCD(cu). We say that a node ui ∈ V (G) with parents(ui) =
u1i , . . . u
d
i ∈ V (G) is green if ℓ
′
ui,s = H
(
s, x(u−1)m+i ◦ ℓ′u1i ,s
◦ . . . ◦ ℓ′
udi ,s
)
i.e., the given label of node
ui is consistent with the labeling rule given the data value x(u−1)m+i and the given labels of ui’s
parents. We say that an edge (um, vi) ∈ E(G) is green if both um and vi are green.
Definition D.2 We call a meta-node u ∈ V (G0) green if both:
• At least 23 fraction of the corresponding nodes u1, . . . , um ∈ V (G) are are green.
• The final node um in the meta-node is also green.
We call a meta-node red if the meta-node is not green. Similarly, we call a meta-node u correct if
we are able to correctly decode the blocks cu and cu+t.
We stress that a red meta-node is not necessarily tampered nor is a green meta-node necessarily
correct.
D.1 Query Procedure for map(i) = t
In the case that map(i) = t, we run a procedure Decw=t(s, i) that takes advantage of the fact that any
adversary that can change at most ∆Jkκ coordinates of any codeword obtained from Enc, cannot
prevent local correction for a query on the last t blocks corresponding to the repetition of ECC
codeword. Similar to Decw1 in Section 3.2, the algorithm Dec
w
=t(s, i) randomly samples a number of
blocks, performs decoding using ECCD and takes the majority of the samples.
Lemma D.3 Let Enc be as described in Section 4.1. For any i ∈ [n] such that map(i) = t, there
exists an algorithm Decw=t that does the following:
(1) For any x ∈ {0, 1}k and c = Enc(s, x), Decc=t(s, i) = c[i].
(2) For any x ∈ {0, 1}k, c = Enc(s, x) and w ∈ {0, 1}n generated by any PPT adversary such that
dist(c, w) ≤ ∆Jkκ ,
Pr [Decw=t(s, i) = c[i]] ≥ 1−
n
nlogn
.
Moreover, Decw=t makes at most O
(
ℓ(λ) · log2+ǫ n
)
coordinate queries to input w.
Proof : Consider the following algorithm Decw=t(s, i) for any i ∈ [n] with map(i) = t:
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Decw=t(s, i):
Input : Index i ∈ [n] with map(i) = t.
(1) Sample (with replacement) s := O
(
log1+ǫ n
)
blocks {y˜1, . . . , y˜s} each of length 4mℓ(λ)
from the last t blocks.
(2) Let yj = ECC(ECCD(y˜j)) for every j ∈ [s] to correct each of the sampled blocks.
(3) Output majority of {yj,ˆi | j ∈ [s]}, where iˆ = i (mod 4mℓ(λ)) and yj,ˆi is the iˆ-th coordi-
nate in yj.
First, note that for any codeword obtained from Enc, Dec=t will always output the correct symbol.
Let w be received word which is obtained by altering at most ∆Jkκ coordinates of some codeword
i.e, 0 < dist(c, w) ≤ ∆Jkκ for some codeword c obtained from Enc.
We know that the last t blocks of any codeword are exactly the same, i.e., c2t = c2t+1 = · · · = c3t.
Since dist(c, w) ≤ ∆Jkκ , at most
t
4κ blocks are corrupted in more than ∆J fraction of coordinates.
One can therefore decode all blocks among the last t blocks correctly except for those t4κ blocks
with large corruption.
Since we query blocks uniformly at random, each query finds a block with large corruption with
probability at most 14κ . Therefore, the probability that majority of the queried blocks are corrupted
beyond repair is at most
(
1
4κ
)s/2
= negl(n), for s = O
(
log1+ǫ n
)
.
Since Dec=t queries O
(
log1+ǫ n
)
blocks each of length 4m · ℓ(λ) and m = O (log n), then at
most O
(
ℓ(λ) · log2+ǫ n
)
queries are made in total. 
D.2 Query Procedure for map(i) < t
Recall from the construction that G0 is the metagraph of G. We define the green subgraph of G0
to be the subgraph consisting of exactly the edges whose endpoints in G are both green nodes. We
show there exists an efficient procedure to check whether an edge is in the green subgraph, which
we shall use to determine if nodes in G have δ-local expansion in the green subgraph. If there is
local expansion around nodes u and v in the green subgraph, then without loss of generality, there
exists a path from u to v that only consists of green nodes by Lemma D.14. Hence if v is correct,
then we show in Lemma D.16 that either u is also correct, or a hash collision has been found.
Nevertheless, this procedure is vacuous if there is a low number of nodes u, v with local expansion
in the green subgraph. To address this concern, we show in Lemma D.12 that for a specific range of
α, if a node u is α-good with respect to a tampered set, then there must also be 2δ-local expansion
around u in the green subgraph.
In this section, we design the corrector for indices i ∈ [n] such that map(i) < t.
Recall that we call a meta-node green if most of its nodes including the final node are green.
First, we claim the existence of a procedure to test whether a meta-node is green.
Lemma D.4 Let G0 be the meta-graph with t vertices used by Enc and let w = (w1, · · · , w3t) ∈
{0, 1}n be the corrupted word obtained from the PPT adversary. There exists a procedure IsGreenMeta
that uses O
(
ℓ(λ) · log2 n
)
coordinate queries to w and checks whether a meta-node u of G0 with
labels corresponding to w is green.
Proof : We claim the following procedure satisfies the desired properties:
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IsGreenMeta(u,w):
Input : Meta-node index u ∈ [t], corrupted codeword w ∈ {0, 1}n
(1) Check if the final node in meta-node u is green:
• Query coordinates of wt+u and retrieve (ℓ
′
u1 , . . . , ℓ
′
um) := ECCD(wt+u).
• Query the coordinates of wu and retrieve (x
′
u1 , . . . , x
′
um) := ECCD(wu).
• Check whether ℓ′um = H(s, x
′
um ◦ℓ
′
u1 ◦· · · ◦ℓ
′
um−1) for the final node um in meta-node
u, where u1, . . . , um−1 are the parents of um, which are all in meta-node u.
• If ℓ′um is not consistent, then output ‘Red’.
(2) For each node uj in meta-node u, check whether uj is green:
• Let uj−1 (in meta-node u) and pr (r-th node in some meta-node p) be the parents
of uj.
• Query wt+p and retrieve ℓ
′
pr using ECCD(wt+p).
• Check whether ℓ′uj = H(s, x
′
uj ◦ ℓ
′
uj−1 ◦ ℓ
′
pr).
(3) If at least 23 fraction of the nodes in meta-node u are green, then output ‘Green’.
(4) Else, output ‘Red’.
Recall from Definition D.2 that a green meta-node first requires that at least 23 of the underlying
nodes in meta-node u are green. Since a node is green if its label is consistent with the labels of its
parents, then the procedure IsGreenMeta properly recognizes whether at least 23 of the underlying
nodes in u are green after decoding using ECCD. Secondly, a green meta-node requires that the
final node in u is green. In this case, the final node um has m− 1 parents, and again the procedure
recognizes whether ℓ′um = H(s, x
′
um ◦ ℓ
′
u1 ◦ · · · ◦ ℓ
′
um−1) after obtaining the labels using ECCD.
Observe that in Step (1), we query two blocks of w each of length 4mℓ(λ) bits. Also, in
Step (2), for each of the m − 1 nodes uj in the meta-node u we query one additional block of w
corresponding to the parent meta-node of uj. Since each block is of length 4mℓ(λ) bits long, the
total query complexity is O
(
m2ℓ(λ)
)
= O
(
ℓ(λ) · log2 n
)
for m = O (log n). 
We now define the notion of a green edge in the meta-graph G0.
Let u and v be meta-nodes which are connected in G0. From the construction of the degree
reduced graph G, we know that there exists an edge from the m-th node of the meta-node u to
some node vu of the meta-node v. We say that an edge from meta-node u to meta-node v is green
if the corresponding end points in G are green, i.e., the node um of meta-node u and the node vu
in meta-node v are green. We say an edge is red if it is not green. Note that it is possible for the
end node vu to be red even if the meta-node v is green.
Given any w ∈ {0, 1}n, we now describe a procedure IsGreenEdge(u, v, w) which locally verifies
whether a given edge (u, v) of G0 is green or not.
Lemma D.5 Let G0 be the meta-graph with t vertices used by Enc and let w = (w1, · · · , w3t) ∈
{0, 1}n be the corrupted word obtained from the PPT adversary. There exists a procedure IsGreenEdge
that makes O (ℓ(λ) log(n)) coordinate queries to w and checks whether an edge (u, v) of G0 with
labels corresponding to w is green.
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Proof :
IsGreenEdge(u, v, w):
Input : Meta graph edge (u, v), corrupted codeword w ∈ {0, 1}n
(1) Check if the final node in meta-node u is green:
• Query coordinates of wt+u and retrieve (ℓ
′
u1 , . . . , ℓ
′
um) := ECCD(wt+u).
• Query the coordinates of wu and retrieve (x
′
u1 , . . . , x
′
um) := ECCD(wu).
• Check whether ℓ′um = H(s, x
′
um ◦ℓ
′
u1 ◦· · · ◦ℓ
′
um−1) for the final node um in meta-node
u, where u1, . . . , um−1 are the parents of um, which are all in meta-node u.
• If ℓ′um is not consistent, then output ‘Red’ edge.
(2) Check if the node vu in meta-node v is green:
• Query coordinates of wt+v and retrieve (ℓ
′
v1 , . . . , ℓ
′
vm) := ECCD(wt+v).
• Query the coordinates of wv and retrieve (x
′
v1 , . . . , x
′
vm) := ECCD(wv).
• Check whether ℓ′vu = H(s, x
′
vu ◦ ℓ
′
vu−1 ◦ ℓ
′
um)
• If ℓ′vu is not consistent, then output ‘Red’ edge.
(3) Output ’Green’ edge.
The procedure IsGreenEdge first checks if the node um of meta-node u is green, and then checks
if the connecting node vu of meta-node v is green. The correctness of IsGreenEdge then follows
from the definition. Note that checks (1) and (2) both query 2 blocks of w, each of length 4mℓ(λ).
Hence the query complexity of the IsGreenEdge is O (mℓ(λ)) = O (ℓ(λ) log(n)), for m = O (log(n)).

Using the definition of a green edge, we now define a green subgraph of G0 and the notion of
local expansion which is an essential ingredient to describe the decoder.
Definition D.6 The green subgraph of G0, denoted by Gg, is the subgraph of G0 that contains all
green edges of G0.
Definition D.7 We say that a DAG G has δ-local expansion around a node v ∈ V if for all r:
(1) A = [v, v + r − 1], B = [v + r, v + 2r − 1] and W ⊆ A, X ⊆ B with |W |, |X| ≥ δr, then there
exists an edge between W and X
(2) C = [v, v − r + 1], D = [v − r, v − 2r + 1] and Y ⊆ C, Z ⊆ D with |Y |, |Z| ≥ δr, then there
exists an edge between Y and Z
Recall that we say that a DAG G is a δ-local expander if all nodes v ∈ V have δ-local expansion.
A key step in designing the decoder is to verify whether Gg has local expansion property
around some given meta-node. Before describe the verification procedure and why it is necessary,
we introduce notations and list some important properties of the meta-graph G0 and its green
subgraph Gg.
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Let u be any meta-node of G0. Let A
u,r := [u, u + r − 1] and Bu,r := [u + r, u + 2r − 1] and
r < 12(t− u), then from the definition of a δ-local expander, we know that G0 contains δ-expander
between Au,r and Bu,r. Let us denote this subgraph by Hu,r, i.e., Hu,r = (Au,r ∪ Bu,r, (Au,r ×
Bu,r) ∩ E). We assume the following property of G0.
Fact D.8 [ABP18] Hu,r has a constant indegree denoted by dδ ∈ O (1).
Define Hu,rg to be the green subgraph of Hu,r, i.e., the subgraph of Hu,r restricted to Gg.
Lemma D.9 Let nr be the number of red edges in H
u,r. If Hu,rg is not a 4δ-expander, then
nr ≥ 3δr.
Proof : If Hu,rg is not a 4δ-expander, then there exist subsets X ⊆ Au,r, Y ⊆ Bu,r with
|X|, |Y | ≥ 4δr such that there are no edges between X and Y in Hu,rg . Since Hu,r is a δ-expander,
at most δr nodes Y ′ ⊂ Y are not connected to any node in X. There are at most |Y − Y ′| ≥ 3δr
nodes which are all connected to X. So the number of edges in Hu,r are at least 3δr all of which
are red. 
Remark D.10 Though the observation states the property for descendants of a meta-node u, i.e.,
Au,r = [u, u+ r− 1] and Bu,r = [u+ r, u+ 2r− 1], we note that it also holds for ancestors as well,
i.e., Au,r = [u− r + 1, u] and Bu,r = [u− 2r − 1, u− r].
Using the key observation described above, we now give an efficient procedure to verify if the
green meta-graph Gg has 4δ-local expansion around a given meta-node u. The idea is to estimate
the number of red edges in increasing intervals around the given meta-node and reject if this
estimate is large for any interval.
Lemma D.11 Let G0 be the meta-graph with t vertices used by Enc and let w = (w1, · · · , w3t) ∈
{0, 1}n be the corrupted word obtained from the PPT adversary. There exists a procedure IsLocalExpander
that makes O
(
mℓ(λ) log2+ǫ t
)
coordinate queries to w and rejects any meta-node u around which
Gg does not have 4δ-local expansion with probability 1− negl(n).
Proof : Consider the following algorithm IsLocalExpander:
IsLocalExpander(u,w, δ):
Input : Green meta node u, corrupted codeword w ∈ {0, 1}n
(1) For every p ∈ {1, . . . , log t}:
• Consider a bipartite expander Hu,2
p
, with node sets Ap = [u, u+ 2
p − 1] and Bp =
[u+ 2p, u+ 2p+1 − 1].
• Randomly sample s := log1+ǫ t edges from the subgraph with replacement.
• Count the number of red edges in the sample.
• If the number of red edges in the sample is larger than 52δs, then ’Reject’.
• Consider a bipartite expander H
′u,2p with node sets A′p = [u− 2p + 1, u] and B′p =
[u− 2p+1 + 1, u− 2p].
• Randomly sample s := log1+ǫ t edges from the subgraph with replacement.
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• Count the number of red edges in the sample.
• If the number of red edges in the sample is larger than 52δs, then ’Reject’.
(2) Accept otherwise.
Note that IsLocalExpander calls the procedure IsGreenEdge for every sampled edge to check whether
it is red or green. Each call to IsGreenEdge requires O (mℓ(λ)) coordinate queries to w. The total
number of calls to IsGreenEdge is at most 2 log2+ǫ t since we sample at most log1+ǫ t distinct edges
from each of the log t subgraph Hu,2
p
. Therefore, the total query complexity of IsLocalExpander is
upper bounded by O (mℓ(λ)) log2+ǫ t.
Suppose u is a meta-node around which Gg does not have 4δ-local expansion. Then there exists
a fixed node set [u, u+2p− 1] and [u+2p, u+2p+1− 1] whose corresponding subgraph has at least
3δ2p red edges, by Lemma D.9. Therefore on sampling uniformly at random with replacement, we
expect to see at least 3δs red edges. So the probability that we see at most 52δs red edges is at
most exp(−O
(
log1+ǫ t
)
), from standard Chernoff bounds.
Note that we accept u if we see at most 52δs red edges in all the 2 log t intervals. By taking union
bound the probability that we accept a meta-node around which Gg does not have 4δ-expansion is
at most 2 log t
exp(−O(log1+ǫ t)) . 
Now, we list some key properties of the meta-nodes around which Gg has local expansion. These
properties are important to understand why we needed the local expansion verification procedure.
Essentially we show that if any meta-node is α-good under the set of tampered meta-nodes, then
Gg has 2δ-local expansion about it (for appropriately chosen value of α). Then we show that any
two meta-nodes around which Gg has local expansion are connected by a path of green nodes in
G. Now similar to the weak CRLCC decoder, we can argue about the correctness of any ancestor
of a correct node in a green path (unless the adversary finds a hash collision).
Recall that we call a meta-node u to be α-good under the T if every interval for every interval
[u, u + r − 1] ∩ T ≤ αr. We see that if a meta-node u is α-good under T , then Gg has 2δ-local
expansion around u.
Lemma D.12 Let u be a meta-node that is α-good with respect to T . Then there is 2δ-local
expansion around u in Gg for any α <
δ
2 .
Proof : Given any r > 0, consider the intervals A = [u, u+ r] and B = [u+ r+1, u+2r]. Recall
that G0 is a δ-local expander. Let X ⊆ A and Y ⊆ B be given sets with size 2δr each. Since u is
α-good with respect to T , then |T ∩ X| ≤ 2αr and |T ∩ Y | ≤ 2αr. Thus, |X − T | ≥ (2δ − 2α)r
and similarly, |Y − T | ≥ (2δ − 2α)r. Setting α < δ2 shows that both X − T and Y − T contains
at least δr nodes, and so there exists an edge between X − T and Y − T . Therefore, there is local
expansion around u. 
Moreover, we see that the number of red edges in the 2δ-expander is at most 3αrdδ.
Lemma D.13 If u is a meta-node that is α-good under T , then for any r > 0 the number of red
edges in between the intervals [u, u+ r − 1] and [u+ r, u+ 2r − 1] is at most 3αrdδ.
Proof : Since u is α-good under T , the intervals A := [u, u+ r − 1] and B := [u+ r, u+ 2r − 1]
contain at most αr and 2αr tampered nodes respectively. Since we assumed that the δ-expander
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contained in A and B has constant degree dδ, the number of red edges is upper bounded by 3αrdδ .

So in order to ensure that this number is not too large (for IsLocalExpander to succeed), we
choose α such that 3αrdδ ≪ 3δr. This guarantees that the procedure IsLocalExpander definitely
accepts nodes that are α-good under T .
We now show that any two meta-nodes with local expansion property are connected by a path
of green edges in Gg. This also ensures that the corresponding nodes are connected by a path of
green nodes in the underlying graph G.
Lemma D.14 If Gg has 4δ-local expansion around the meta nodes u and v, then there exists a
path from u to v in Gg.
Proof : Let r be such that v = u+2r− 1. Consider the 4δ expander between A := [u, u+ r− 1]
and B := [u + r, u + 2r − 1]. We show using Claim D.15 that u is connected to at least 4δr
meta-nodes in A, and similarly v is reachable from at least 4δr meta-nodes in B. Now since Gg
has 4δ expansion around u, there exists an edge between any two large enough subset of nodes of
A and B. Hence, the set of nodes reachable to u in A are connected to the set of nodes which are
reachable from v in B.
It now remains to show that u and v are connected to at least 4δr meta-nodes in A and B
respectively. Let i be such that 2i ≤ r < 2i+1. From Claim D.15, we get that u is connected to at
least 34 · 2
i = 38 · 2
i+1 ≥ 4δr (for δ < 116) meta-nodes in the interval [u, u + r − 1]. Using a similar
argument we conclude that v is also connected to at least 4δr nodes in [v−r+1, v] = [u+r, u+2r−1].
We now prove Claim D.15.
Claim D.15 For any i > 0, the number of meta-nodes in the interval [u, u+2i−1] reachable from
u is at least 34 · 2
i. Similarly, the number of meta-nodes in the interval [u− 2i+1, u] reachable from
u is at least 34 · 2
i
Proof : We prove this claim by induction on i. Let Ri(u) denote the set of meta-nodes in
[u, u+ 2i − 1] reachable from u. We have to show that |Ri(u)| ≥
3
4 · 2
i.
In the base case, for i = 0, we know from 4δ-expansion of [u, u + 1] around u that there is at
least one edge between u and u+ 1 in Gg. Hence, |R0(u)| ≥ 1.
Let us assume the induction hypothesis for all i ≤ i0. To prove the induction step for i = i0+1,
consider the intervals A := [u, u + 2i0 − 1] and B := [u + 2i0 , u + 2i0+1 − 1]. Let NR denote the
set of non-reachable meta-nodes in B not reachable from A. We know that |NR| < 4δ · 2i0 . This
follows from the fact that Gg has 4δ-local expansion around u, and hence if |NR| ≥ 4δ · 2
i0 , then
there would be a an edge between Ri0(u) and NR which would contradict the definition of NR.
Therefore,
Ri0+1(u) ≥ Ri0(u) + 2
i0 − |NR|
≥
3
4
· 2i0 + 2i0 − 4δ · 2i0 (from IH)
≥
3
4
· 2i0+1 (for δ < 116 ).


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Lemma D.16 Suppose there exists a path from meta-node u to v in the green subgraph Gg. If v is
untampered (correct), then either u is also untampered or the adversary has found a hash collision.
Proof : The proof of this lemma follows from the proof of Lemma 3.3 once we show that there
exists a path in G with all green nodes from any node in the meta-node u to some node in the
meta-node v.
Consider the path from meta-nodes u to v in Gg. Any two adjacent edges (p, q) and (q, r) in
(u, v) path in Gg corresponds to the edge from the last node pm of p to some node qi (i < m) of
meta-node q, and an edge from the last node qm of q to some node rj (j < m) of meta-node r. Since
these edges are green, we know that the nodes pi, pm and qj are green. Now, from the construction
of the graph G, we conclude that there is an edge from pi to pm. Therefore, there is a path in G
from any node in the meta-node u to some node in the meta-node v with all green nodes. 
Equipped with all the necessary procedures, we now present the decoder for the Strong CRLCC
for any coordinate query i ∈ [n] such that map(i) < t.
Decw<t: Input : Index i ∈ [n] with u := map(i) < t of G,
δ
20dδ
≤ α ≤ δ10dδ , δ <
1
16 space
parameter ǫ > 0.
(1) Use IsLocalExpander to verify if Gg has 4δ-local expansion around u.
(2) If IsLocalExpander accepts u, then
• If u < 3t4 then return wi.
• Else if 3t4 ≤ u < t:
◦ Use Decw=t(w, j) for all 8tmℓ(λ)− 4mℓ(λ) ≤ j < 8tmℓ(λ) to reconstruct the last
block w2t.
◦ If Gg has 4δ-local expansion around t using the constructed labeling, then return
wi, else return ⊥.
(3) If IsLocalExpander rejects u, then return ⊥.
Lemma D.17 Let Enc be as described in Section 4.1. For any i ∈ [n] such that map(i) < t, Dec<t
does the following:
(1) For any x ∈ {0, 1}k and c = Enc(s, x), Decc<t(s, i) = c[i].
(2) For any x ∈ {0, 1}k, c = Enc(s, x) and w ∈ {0, 1}n generated by any PPT adversary such that
dist(c, w) ≤ ∆Jkκ ,
Pr [Decw<t(s, i) ∈ {c[i],⊥}] ≥ 1− negl(n).
Moreover, Decw<t makes at most O
(
ℓ(λ) log3+ǫ n
)
queries to input w.
Before we prove the correctness of Lemma D.17, we show that any PPT adversary that generates
a corrupted codeword w such that dist(w, c) ≤
∆jk
κ , cannot manage to corrupt many meta-nodes.
Let T denote the set of tampered meta-nodes of G0.
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Lemma D.18 Let w ∈ {0, 1}n be a corrupted codeword generated by any PPT adversary such that
dist(w,C) ≤
∆jk
κ , then at most
t
4κ meta-nodes are tampered.
Proof : We first observe that a meta-node can only be altered beyond repair by changing
at least 4m · ℓ(λ) · ∆J bits. Therefore, by changing at most
∆Jk
κ bits of the codeword we have
|T | ≤ k4κmℓ(λ) =
k′
4κm =
t
4κ meta-nodes in G are tampered. 
Using these key lemmas and properties, we now prove the correctness of the decoder.
Proof : [Proof of Lemma D.17]
Query Complexity: The query complexity of the decoder is dominated by the query com-
plexity of IsLocalExpander. From Lemma D.11, it then follows that the query complexity of Decw<t
is at most O
(
mℓ(λ) log2+ǫ t
)
= O
(
mℓ(λ) log2+ǫ n
)
for m = O (log n).
Correctness (1): If w ∈ C, then the green graph Gg = G0 and hence, Gg has δ expansion
around all meta-nodes u. Also, since T = ∅, all meta-nodes are α-good in G0 with respect to T .
Therefore, Dec<t accepts a codeword with probability 1.
Correctness (2): Now, let w be a corrupted codeword such that dist(d, c) ≤ ∆Jkκ . Let
u = map(i) be the meta-node corresponding to the queried index i ∈ [n].
Case (i): Let u < 3t4 , and let Gg have 4δ-local expansion around u. We show that there exists
a descendent v of u in Gg such that (1) Gg is 4δ-local expander around v and, (2) v is untampered
(correct).
Recall that T denotes the set of tampered meta-nodes. From Lemma D.18, we know that at
most t4κ meta-nodes can be tampered by the adversary. Since G0 is a δ-local expander, from
Lemma B.8 we know that the number of α-good meta-nodes in G0 with respect to the set of
tampered meta-nodes T is at least t − |T |
(
2−α
α
)
. Therefore, for any α > 1200dδ and κ ≥ 1600dδ ,
there are at least 15t16 α-good meta-nodes in G0 w.r.t T . Lemma D.12 then implies that Gg has
4δ-local expansion around all these α good meta-nodes. So at most t16 +
t
16 =
t
8 meta-nodes which
do not satisfy conditions (1) or (2). Therefore, there exists at least one among the last t4meta-nodes
which satisfy both the conditions.
Case (ii): Let u ≥ 3t4 , and let t be the corrected meta-node using Dec
w
=t (see Lemma D.3). If
Gg has 4δ-local expansion around u and t, then assuming that the adversary has not found a hash
collision, we can conclude from Lemma D.16, that u is untampered. So Decw<t returns the correct
value for all such coordinate queries.
The probability that the decoder returns a wrong value is upper bounded by the probability
that the procedure IsLocalExpander wrongly accepts a meta-node about which Gg does not have 4δ
local expansion or if the adversary successfully finds a hash collision. This happens with negl(n)
probability as shown in Lemma D.11. 
To conclude, we need to show that for any received word generated by a PPT adversary most
meta-nodes are corrected by the decoder (i.e Decw(s, i) 6= ⊥ ). In particular, we show that most
meta-nodes of G0 are untampered, and Gg had 4δ local expansion around each of these untampered
meta-nodes.
This follows from the fact that there are at most t16 meta-nodes are not α-good under the set of
tampered nodes. Note that for any query to a meta-node u < 3t4 the decoder Dec
w(s, i) returns the
correct codeword symbol, i.e., c[i] unless u itself is not α-good under the set of tampered nodes.
So, for at least 3t4 −
t
16 =
11t
16 meta-node queries, Dec
w(s, i) does not return a ⊥.
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E Computationally Relaxed Locally Decodable Codes (CRLDC)
In this section of the appendix we present the formal definition of a Computationally Relaxed
Locally Decodable Codes (CRLDC) — defined informally in the main body of the paper. We first
tweak the definition of a local code so that local decoding algorithm takes as input an index from
the range i ∈ [k] instead of i ∈ [n] i.e., the goal is to decode a bit of the original message as opposed
to a bit of the original codeword.
Definition E.1 A local code is a tuple (Gen,Enc,Dec) of probabilistic algorithms such that
• Gen(1λ) takes as input security parameter λ and generates a public seed s ∈ {0, 1}∗. This
public seed s is fixed once and for all.
• Enc takes as input the public seed s and a message x ∈ Σk and outputs a codeword c = Enc(s, x)
with c ∈ Σn.
• Dec takes as input the public seed s, an index i ∈ [k], and is given oracle access to a word
w ∈ Σn. Decw(s, i) outputs a symbol b ∈ Σ (which is supposed to be the value at position i of
the original message x i.e., the string x s.t. Enc(s, x) is closest codeword to w).
We say that the (information) rate of the code (Gen,Enc,Dec) is k/n. We say that the code is
efficient if Gen,Enc,Dec are all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms.
Similarly, the notional of a computational adversarial channel is almost identical except that
the channel challenges the Dec with an index i ∈ [k] (as opposed to i ∈ [n]) and the decoder is
supposed to output the ith bit of the original message. Apart from this change Definition E.2 and
Definition 2.2 are identical.
Definition E.2 A computational adversarial channel A with error rate τ is an algorithm that
interacts with a local code (Gen,Enc,Dec) in rounds, as follows. In each round of the execution,
given a security parameter λ,
(1) Generate s← Gen(1λ); s is public, so Enc, Dec, and A have access to s
(2) The channel A on input s hands a message x to the sender.
(3) The sender computes c = Enc(s, x) and hands it back to the channel (in fact the channel can
compute c without this interaction).
(4) The channel A corrupts at most τn entries of c to obtain a word w ∈ Σn and selects a
challenge index i ∈ [k]; w is given to the receiver’s Dec with query access along with the
challenge index i.
(5) The receiver outputs b← Decw(s, i).
(6) We define A(s)’s probability of fooling Dec on this round to be pA,s = Pr[b 6∈ {⊥, xi}], where
the probability is taken only over the randomness of the Decw(s, i). We say that A(s) is
γ-successful at fooling Dec if pA,s > γ. We say that A(s) is ρ-successful at limiting Dec if
|GoodA,s| < ρ·k, where GoodA,s ⊆ [k] is the set of indices j such that Pr[Decw(s, j) = xj] > 23 .
We use FoolA,s(γ, τ, λ) (resp. LimitA,s(ρ, τ, λ)) to denote the event that the attacker was γ-
successful at fooling Dec (resp. ρ-successful at limiting Dec) on this round.
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Definition E.3 ((Computational) Relaxed Locally Decodable Codes (CRLDC)) A local
code (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a (q, τ, ρ, γ(·), µ(·))-CRLCC against a class A of adversaries if Decw makes
at most q queries to w and satisfies the following:
(1) For all public seeds s if w← Enc(s, x) then Decw(s, i) outputs xi.
(2) For all A ∈ A we have Pr[FoolA,s(γ(λ), τ, λ)] ≤ µ(λ), where the randomness is taken over the
selection of s← Gen(1λ) as well as A’s random coins.
(3) For all A ∈ A we have Pr[LimitA,s(ρ, τ, λ)] ≤ µ(λ), where the randomness is taken over the
selection of s← Gen(1λ) as well as A’s random coins.
When µ(λ) = 0, γ(λ) = 13 is a constant and A is the set of all (computationally unbounded)
channels we say that the code is a (q, τ, ρ, γ)-RLDC. When µ(·) is a negligible function and A is
restricted to the set of all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) attackers we say that the code is a
(q, τ, ρ, γ)-CRLDC (computational relaxed locally correctable code).
We say that a code that satisfies conditions 1 and 2 is a Weak CRLDC, while a code satisfying
conditions 1, 2 and 3 is a Strong CRLDC code.
As we remarked in the main body of the paper our construction of a Strong CRLCC is also a
strong CRLDC. In particular, Theorem E.4 is identical to Theorem 2.5 except that we replaced the
word CRLCC with CRLDC.
Theorem E.4 Assuming the existence of a collision-resistant hash function (GenH,H) with length
ℓ(λ), there exists a constant 0 < τ ′ < 1 and negligible functions µ(·), γ(·) such that for all τ ≤ τ ′
there exist constants 0 < r(τ), ρ(τ) < 1 such that there exists a (ℓ(λ) · polylogn, τ, ρ(τ), γ(·), µ(·))-
Strong CRLDC of blocklength n over the binary alphabet with rate r(τ) where r(.) and ρ(.) have the
property that limτ→0 r(τ) = 1 and limτ→0 ρ(τ) = 1. In particular, if ℓ(λ) = polylog λ and λ ∈ Θ(n)
then the code is a (polylog n, τ, ρ, γ, µ(·))-Strong CRLDC.
Proof : (sketch) The encoding algorithm in our strong CRLDC and strong CRLCC constructions
are identical. The only change that we need to make is to tweak the local decoding algorithm to
output bits of the original message instead of bits of the codeword. This task turns out to be
trivial. In particular, the first part of the codeword in our construction is formed by partitioning
the original message x into mt blocks x = x1 ◦ . . . ◦ xtm, partitioning these blocks into t groups
T1 = (x1 ◦ . . . xm) , . . . , Tt =
(
x(t−1)m+1 ◦ . . . xtm
)
and outputting cj = ECC(Tj) for each j ≤ t.
Because our rate r(τ) approaches 1 these bits account for almost all of the codeword.
The CRLCC decoding algorithm is given (possibly tampered) codeword c˜ = c˜1 ◦ c˜2 . . .. When
the decoding algorithm is challenged for one of the original bits of cj it works as follows: (1) use our
randomized algorithm verify that the corresponding metanode vj in our graph is α-good (if not we
output ⊥), (2) if vj is α-good then run ECCD (c˜j) to recover the original Tj =
(
x(j−1)m+1, . . . , xjm
)
,
(3) run ECC(Tj) to recover the original cj and then find the appropriate bit of the codeword to
output. The CRLDC decoding algorithm can simply omit step (3). Once we have recovered the
original Tj we can find the appropriate bit of the original message to output. 
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